Ios Sim — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "ios-sim-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "ios-sim-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "ios-sim-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (40 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"eval_js\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"eval_js\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"eval\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "eval_js"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"eval_js_reset\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"eval_js_reset\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"eval\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "eval_js_reset"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/actions.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/actions.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/actions.ts"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import { runIdb } from \"./idb.js\"; import { state } from \"./state.js\"; import {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/actions.ts",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/idb.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/idb.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/idb.ts"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; const IDB = process.env.IDB_BIN || \"idb\"; export class IdbError extends Error",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/idb.ts",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/logs.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/logs.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/logs.ts"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import { state } from \"./state.js\"; export interface LogStreamOpts { bundleId",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/logs.ts",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/state.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/state.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/state.ts"
},
"evidence": "ildProcess } from \"node:child_process\"; import type { Snapshot } from \"./snapshot.js\"; import type { DylibClient } from",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/state.ts",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([network_tail, network_get_body]) co-exist with external-action tools ([eval_js, eval_js_reset, network_self_test]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "network_tail → eval_js"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [network_tail, network_get_body] → sinks [eval_js, eval_js_reset, network_self_test]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"network_tail",
"network_get_body"
],
"sinks": [
"eval_js",
"eval_js_reset",
"network_self_test"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"url\" on \"network_self_test\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"network_self_test\" takes a URL/host parameter \"url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "network_self_test",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.url"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "url"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"code\" on \"eval_js\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"eval_js\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"code\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "eval_js",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.code"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "code"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"eval_js\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"eval_js\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "eval_js"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"eval_js_reset\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"eval_js_reset\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "eval_js_reset"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"network_tail",
"network_get_body"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"eval_js",
"eval_js_reset",
"network_self_test"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_simulators",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "use_simulator",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "snapshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tap",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "type_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "paste_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "button",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "swipe",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scroll",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "launch_app",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dylib_ping",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dylib_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dylib_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "view_tree",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "view_hit_test",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "view_get_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "view_set_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "eval_js",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"eval\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "eval_js_reset",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"eval\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "network_start",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "network_stop",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "network_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "network_tail",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "network_get_body",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "network_clear",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "network_stub",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "network_stubs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "network_unstub",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "network_unstub_all",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "network_self_test",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"http_request\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "dylib_call",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminate_app",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "screenshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "await_quiescent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "log_start",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "log_tail",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "log_stop",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "log_clear",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "6d77f36b635f587427bcc93b497d78b915cc46bdf2c4fa771571d3e90ffa463c",
"stats": {
"tools": 40,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 6,
"medium": 3,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}