Ios Sim MCP Server
ios-sim-mcp
npm
v0.4.2
Published by rmathew1973 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server that drives the iOS Simulator via semantic accessibility-tree snapshots with stable refs. Includes an injectable dylib for in-process view introspection, HTTP capture, JavaScript eval, and byte-perfect text input. Chrome-DevTools-quality DX for
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Tool "eval_js" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_js" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_js
high Tool "eval_js_reset" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_js_reset" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_js_reset
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/actions.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/actions.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { runIdb } from "./idb.js"; import { state } from "./state.js"; import {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/actions.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/idb.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/idb.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; const IDB = process.env.IDB_BIN || "idb"; export class IdbError extends Error
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/idb.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/logs.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/logs.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { state } from "./state.js"; export interface LogStreamOpts { bundleId
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/logs.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/state.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/state.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ildProcess } from "node:child_process"; import type { Snapshot } from "./snapshot.js"; import type { DylibClient } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/state.ts
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([network_tail, network_get_body]) co-exist with external-action tools ([eval_js, eval_js_reset, network_self_test]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [network_tail, network_get_body] → sinks [eval_js, eval_js_reset, network_self_test]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow network_tail → eval_js
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "network_self_test"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "network_self_test" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool network_self_test · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained command parameter "code" on "eval_js"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "eval_js" takes a command-shaped parameter "code" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool eval_js · inputSchema.properties.code
low Mutating tool "eval_js" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_js" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_js
low Mutating tool "eval_js_reset" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_js_reset" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_js_reset
Tools 40
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
eval_jsruns code / shelleval_js_resetruns code / shellnetwork_get_bodyingests untrusted inputnetwork_self_testnetwork egressnetwork_tailingests untrusted inputawait_quiescentno sensitive capabilitybuttonno sensitive capabilitydylib_callno sensitive capabilitydylib_healthno sensitive capabilitydylib_infono sensitive capability
Show 30 more tools ↓
dylib_pingno sensitive capabilityfindno sensitive capabilitykeyno sensitive capabilitylaunch_appno sensitive capabilitylist_simulatorsno sensitive capabilitylog_clearno sensitive capabilitylog_startno sensitive capabilitylog_stopno sensitive capabilitylog_tailno sensitive capabilitynetwork_clearno sensitive capabilitynetwork_startno sensitive capabilitynetwork_statusno sensitive capabilitynetwork_stopno sensitive capabilitynetwork_stubno sensitive capabilitynetwork_stubsno sensitive capabilitynetwork_unstubno sensitive capabilitynetwork_unstub_allno sensitive capabilitypaste_textno sensitive capabilityscreenshotno sensitive capabilityscrollno sensitive capabilitysnapshotno sensitive capabilityswipeno sensitive capabilitytapno sensitive capabilityterminate_appno sensitive capabilitytype_textno sensitive capabilityuse_simulatorno sensitive capabilityview_get_textno sensitive capabilityview_hit_testno sensitive capabilityview_set_textno sensitive capabilityview_treeno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (40 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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