Iloso — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "iloso",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "iloso"
},
"server": {
"name": "iloso"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (33 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli.js"
},
"evidence": "awnSync as at}from\"node:child_process\";import T from\"cli-table3\";import{fileURLToPath as ot}from\"node:url\";import st fro",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src-BauCy-LI.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src-BauCy-LI.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src-BauCy-LI.js"
},
"evidence": "close(){this.#e.close()}exec(e){this.#e.exec(e)}pragma(e){this.#e.exec(`PRAGMA ${e}`)}prepare(e){return new Ye(this.#e.p",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src-BauCy-LI.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src-D8jNiq5t.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src-D8jNiq5t.js:559`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src-D8jNiq5t.js"
},
"evidence": ".#database.close(); } exec(sql) { this.#database.exec(sql); } pragma(statement) { this.#database.exec(`PRAGMA ${",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src-D8jNiq5t.js",
"line": 559,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/src-BauCy-LI.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src-BauCy-LI.js:2`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src-BauCy-LI.js"
},
"evidence": "base64`)}`);let r=await fetch(`https://api.x.com/2/oauth2/token`,{method:`POST`,headers:n,body:t});if(!r.ok)throw Error(",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/src-BauCy-LI.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "ilo_create_x_article_monitor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_list_x_article_monitors",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_set_x_article_monitor_enabled",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_delete_x_article_monitor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_refresh_x_articles",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_search_x_articles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_get_x_article",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_sync_x_following",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_x_following_sync_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_search_x_following",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_get_x_following_profile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_create_x_monitor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_list_x_monitors",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_set_x_monitor_enabled",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_delete_x_monitor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_refresh_x_inbox",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_list_x_inbox",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_get_x_inbox_item",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_update_x_inbox_item",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_record_x_inbox_feedback",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_list_publishing_accounts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_set_default_publishing_account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_sync_x_followers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_x_follower_sync_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_search_x_followers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_get_x_follower_profile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_create_draft",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_list_drafts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_schedule_draft",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_publish_draft",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_publish_post",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ilo_run_scheduler",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "eee277258ce12576b5c7875597038fd79d603ba02b7fc5f2f662fc45b31e7c67",
"stats": {
"tools": 33,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 3,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}