Iloso MCP Server
iloso
npm
v0.6.2
Source verified
Published by iannuttall — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
A local-first social publishing CLI and MCP server for AI agents.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: awnSync as at}from"node:child_process";import T from"cli-table3";import{fileURLToPath as ot}from"node:url";import st fro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src-BauCy-LI.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src-BauCy-LI.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: close(){this.#e.close()}exec(e){this.#e.exec(e)}pragma(e){this.#e.exec(`PRAGMA ${e}`)}prepare(e){return new Ye(this.#e.p
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src-BauCy-LI.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src-D8jNiq5t.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src-D8jNiq5t.js:559`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .#database.close(); } exec(sql) { this.#database.exec(sql); } pragma(statement) { this.#database.exec(`PRAGMA ${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src-D8jNiq5t.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/src-BauCy-LI.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/src-BauCy-LI.js:2`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: base64`)}`);let r=await fetch(`https://api.x.com/2/oauth2/token`,{method:`POST`,headers:n,body:t});if(!r.ok)throw Error(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src-BauCy-LI.js
Tools 33
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ilo_refresh_x_articlesingests untrusted inputilo_create_draftno sensitive capabilityilo_create_x_article_monitorno sensitive capabilityilo_create_x_monitorno sensitive capabilityilo_delete_x_article_monitorno sensitive capabilityilo_delete_x_monitorno sensitive capabilityilo_get_x_articleno sensitive capabilityilo_get_x_follower_profileno sensitive capabilityilo_get_x_following_profileno sensitive capabilityilo_get_x_inbox_itemno sensitive capability
Show 23 more tools ↓
ilo_list_draftsno sensitive capabilityilo_list_publishing_accountsno sensitive capabilityilo_list_x_article_monitorsno sensitive capabilityilo_list_x_inboxno sensitive capabilityilo_list_x_monitorsno sensitive capabilityilo_publish_draftno sensitive capabilityilo_publish_postno sensitive capabilityilo_record_x_inbox_feedbackno sensitive capabilityilo_refresh_x_inboxno sensitive capabilityilo_run_schedulerno sensitive capabilityilo_schedule_draftno sensitive capabilityilo_search_x_articlesno sensitive capabilityilo_search_x_followersno sensitive capabilityilo_search_x_followingno sensitive capabilityilo_set_default_publishing_accountno sensitive capabilityilo_set_x_article_monitor_enabledno sensitive capabilityilo_set_x_monitor_enabledno sensitive capabilityilo_statusno sensitive capabilityilo_sync_x_followersno sensitive capabilityilo_sync_x_followingno sensitive capabilityilo_update_x_inbox_itemno sensitive capabilityilo_x_follower_sync_statusno sensitive capabilityilo_x_following_sync_statusno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (33 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.6.2 latest |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan iloso --onlineMore in Developer Tools
Hotel booking MCP server — 300K+ properties, real confirmation numbers, loyalty programs. Builders monetize every booking via Stripe Connect. The first MCP server that completes real hotel reservations inside AI conversations.
Manage AdGuard Home through AI assistants
Read-only Azure DevOps for MCP clients using only your existing browser session — no PAT, no Azure CLI. Browse work items, pull requests, comments, attachments and Artifacts feeds across every project, repo and feed you can access.
MCP server for Adobe Experience Manager Assets integration development
Servidor MCP para el tiempo oficial de España (API pública OpenData de AEMET). Predicción, observación y avisos como herramientas MCP tipadas.
A standalone MCP stdio bridge for Affinity by Canva's local MCP SSE server.