Illustrator — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "illustrator-mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "illustrator-mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "illustrator-mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (67 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"set_z_order\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"set_z_order\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "set_z_order"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/bundle.cjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/bundle.cjs:2944`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/bundle.cjs"
},
"evidence": "const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/bundle.cjs",
"line": 2944,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/jsx/helpers/common.jsx)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/jsx/helpers/common.jsx:68`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/jsx/helpers/common.jsx"
},
"evidence": ".substring(1); return eval(\"(\" + str + \")\"); // eslint-disable-line no-eval } // --- ファイル I/O --- function readParam",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/jsx/helpers/common.jsx",
"line": 68,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/bundle.cjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/bundle.cjs:30206`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/bundle.cjs"
},
"evidence": "sx-runner.ts var import_child_process = require(\"child_process\"); var fs2 = __toESM(require(\"fs/promises\"), 1); var impo",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/bundle.cjs",
"line": 30206,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/executor/jsx-runner.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/executor/jsx-runner.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/executor/jsx-runner.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execFile } from 'child_process'; import * as fs from 'fs/promises'; import { existsSync } from 'fs'; import * as",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/executor/jsx-runner.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"command\" on \"set_z_order\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"set_z_order\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "set_z_order",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "command"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"set_z_order\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"set_z_order\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "set_z_order"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "export_pdf",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "align_objects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "assign_color_profile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply_graphic_style",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_graphic_styles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply_text_style",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_text_styles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "close_document",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_to_outlines",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_crop_marks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_document",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_ellipse",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_gradient",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_line",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_path_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_path",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_rectangle",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_text_frame",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_objects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "duplicate_objects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "group_objects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "import_svg_as_editable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "manage_artboards",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "manage_datasets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "manage_layers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "manage_linked_images",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "manage_swatches",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "modify_object",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "move_to_layer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "open_document",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "place_color_chips",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "place_image",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "place_style_guide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "place_symbol",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "replace_color",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resize_for_variation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_document",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "select_objects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_z_order",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"command\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "undo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ungroup_objects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_contrast",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_coordinate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract_design_tokens",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_objects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_artboards",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_colors",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_document_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_document_structure",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_effects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_groups",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_guidelines",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_images",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_layers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_overprint_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_path_items",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_selection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_separation_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_symbols",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_text_frame_detail",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_fonts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_text_frames",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_text_consistency",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_illustrator_version",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_workflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "6b54e644b9443b3d71a7ea0d0583e0c8d872ae1247b3a789368fc34120ac6e22",
"stats": {
"tools": 67,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 5,
"medium": 1,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}