illustrator-mcp-server
npm
v1.7.0
Source verified
Published by ie3jp — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for reading, manipulating, and exporting Adobe Illustrator design data
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Tool "set_z_order" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool set_z_order
In the server's implementation (`dist/bundle.cjs:2944`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/bundle.cjs
In the server's implementation (`dist/jsx/helpers/common.jsx:68`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .substring(1); return eval("(" + str + ")"); // eslint-disable-line no-eval } // --- ファイル I/O --- function readParam
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/jsx/helpers/common.jsx
In the server's implementation (`dist/bundle.cjs:30206`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: sx-runner.ts var import_child_process = require("child_process"); var fs2 = __toESM(require("fs/promises"), 1); var impo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/bundle.cjs
In the server's implementation (`dist/executor/jsx-runner.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from 'child_process'; import * as fs from 'fs/promises'; import { existsSync } from 'fs'; import * as
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/executor/jsx-runner.js
Tool "set_z_order" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool set_z_order · inputSchema.properties.command
Tool "set_z_order" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool set_z_order
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
set_z_orderruns code / shellalign_objectsno sensitive capabilityapply_graphic_styleno sensitive capabilityapply_text_styleno sensitive capabilityassign_color_profileno sensitive capabilitycheck_contrastno sensitive capabilitycheck_text_consistencyno sensitive capabilityclose_documentno sensitive capabilityconvert_coordinateno sensitive capabilityconvert_to_outlinesno sensitive capabilitycreate_crop_marksno sensitive capabilitycreate_documentno sensitive capabilitycreate_ellipseno sensitive capabilitycreate_gradientno sensitive capabilitycreate_lineno sensitive capabilitycreate_pathno sensitive capabilitycreate_path_textno sensitive capabilitycreate_rectangleno sensitive capabilitycreate_text_frameno sensitive capabilitydelete_objectsno sensitive capabilityduplicate_objectsno sensitive capabilityexportno sensitive capabilityexport_pdfno sensitive capabilityextract_design_tokensno sensitive capabilityfind_objectsno sensitive capabilityget_artboardsno sensitive capabilityget_colorsno sensitive capabilityget_document_infono sensitive capabilityget_document_structureno sensitive capabilityget_effectsno sensitive capabilityget_groupsno sensitive capabilityget_guidelinesno sensitive capabilityget_imagesno sensitive capabilityget_layersno sensitive capabilityget_overprint_infono sensitive capabilityget_path_itemsno sensitive capabilityget_selectionno sensitive capabilityget_separation_infono sensitive capabilityget_symbolsno sensitive capabilityget_text_frame_detailno sensitive capabilitygroup_objectsno sensitive capabilityimport_svg_as_editableno sensitive capabilitylist_fontsno sensitive capabilitylist_graphic_stylesno sensitive capabilitylist_text_framesno sensitive capabilitylist_text_stylesno sensitive capabilitymanage_artboardsno sensitive capabilitymanage_datasetsno sensitive capabilitymanage_layersno sensitive capabilitymanage_linked_imagesno sensitive capabilitymanage_swatchesno sensitive capabilitymodify_objectno sensitive capabilitymove_to_layerno sensitive capabilityopen_documentno sensitive capabilityplace_color_chipsno sensitive capabilityplace_imageno sensitive capabilityplace_style_guideno sensitive capabilityplace_symbolno sensitive capabilitypreflight_checkno sensitive capabilityreplace_colorno sensitive capabilityresize_for_variationno sensitive capabilitysave_documentno sensitive capabilityselect_objectsno sensitive capabilityset_illustrator_versionno sensitive capabilityset_workflowno sensitive capabilityundono sensitive capabilityungroup_objectsno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.7.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.6.2 |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v1.5.1 |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-05 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan illustrator-mcp-server --online
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