Illustrator MCP Server

illustrator-mcp-server npm v1.7.0 Source verified

Published by ie3jp — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.

MCP server for reading, manipulating, and exporting Adobe Illustrator design data

Trust grade
A
94/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 94/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 94/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 7

high Tool "set_z_order" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "set_z_order" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool set_z_order

high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/bundle.cjs)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`dist/bundle.cjs:2944`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/bundle.cjs

high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/jsx/helpers/common.jsx)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`dist/jsx/helpers/common.jsx:68`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: .substring(1); return eval("(" + str + ")"); // eslint-disable-line no-eval } // --- ファイル I/O --- function readParam

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/jsx/helpers/common.jsx

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/bundle.cjs)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/bundle.cjs:30206`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: sx-runner.ts var import_child_process = require("child_process"); var fs2 = __toESM(require("fs/promises"), 1); var impo

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/bundle.cjs

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/executor/jsx-runner.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/executor/jsx-runner.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: port { execFile } from 'child_process'; import * as fs from 'fs/promises'; import { existsSync } from 'fs'; import * as

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/executor/jsx-runner.js

medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "set_z_order"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "set_z_order" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool set_z_order · inputSchema.properties.command

low Mutating tool "set_z_order" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "set_z_order" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool set_z_order

Tools 67

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • set_z_orderruns code / shell
  • align_objectsno sensitive capability
  • apply_graphic_styleno sensitive capability
  • apply_text_styleno sensitive capability
  • assign_color_profileno sensitive capability
  • check_contrastno sensitive capability
  • check_text_consistencyno sensitive capability
  • close_documentno sensitive capability
  • convert_coordinateno sensitive capability
  • convert_to_outlinesno sensitive capability
Show 57 more tools ↓
  • create_crop_marksno sensitive capability
  • create_documentno sensitive capability
  • create_ellipseno sensitive capability
  • create_gradientno sensitive capability
  • create_lineno sensitive capability
  • create_pathno sensitive capability
  • create_path_textno sensitive capability
  • create_rectangleno sensitive capability
  • create_text_frameno sensitive capability
  • delete_objectsno sensitive capability
  • duplicate_objectsno sensitive capability
  • exportno sensitive capability
  • export_pdfno sensitive capability
  • extract_design_tokensno sensitive capability
  • find_objectsno sensitive capability
  • get_artboardsno sensitive capability
  • get_colorsno sensitive capability
  • get_document_infono sensitive capability
  • get_document_structureno sensitive capability
  • get_effectsno sensitive capability
  • get_groupsno sensitive capability
  • get_guidelinesno sensitive capability
  • get_imagesno sensitive capability
  • get_layersno sensitive capability
  • get_overprint_infono sensitive capability
  • get_path_itemsno sensitive capability
  • get_selectionno sensitive capability
  • get_separation_infono sensitive capability
  • get_symbolsno sensitive capability
  • get_text_frame_detailno sensitive capability
  • group_objectsno sensitive capability
  • import_svg_as_editableno sensitive capability
  • list_fontsno sensitive capability
  • list_graphic_stylesno sensitive capability
  • list_text_framesno sensitive capability
  • list_text_stylesno sensitive capability
  • manage_artboardsno sensitive capability
  • manage_datasetsno sensitive capability
  • manage_layersno sensitive capability
  • manage_linked_imagesno sensitive capability
  • manage_swatchesno sensitive capability
  • modify_objectno sensitive capability
  • move_to_layerno sensitive capability
  • open_documentno sensitive capability
  • place_color_chipsno sensitive capability
  • place_imageno sensitive capability
  • place_style_guideno sensitive capability
  • place_symbolno sensitive capability
  • preflight_checkno sensitive capability
  • replace_colorno sensitive capability
  • resize_for_variationno sensitive capability
  • save_documentno sensitive capability
  • select_objectsno sensitive capability
  • set_illustrator_versionno sensitive capability
  • set_workflowno sensitive capability
  • undono sensitive capability
  • ungroup_objectsno sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Versions 3

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.7.0 latest A 94/100 7 1.13.0 2026-09-07
v1.6.2 A 94/100 7 1.13.0 2026-09-01
v1.5.1 A 94/100 7 1.12.1 2026-08-05

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MCP Trust Score: A · 94/100
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The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan illustrator-mcp-server --online

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