Devassets — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "@hyphen-network/devassets",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@hyphen-network/devassets"
},
"server": {
"name": "@hyphen-network/devassets"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/mcp/server.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/server.js:269`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/mcp/server.js"
},
"evidence": ", '/.gnupg', '/.aws', '/.config/gcloud']; const isSensitiveDotdir = sensitiveRoots.some(s => resolvedPath.includ",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/mcp/server.js",
"line": 269,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/run.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/run.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/commands/run.js"
},
"evidence": "ort { spawnSync } from 'child_process'; import { getProject, resolveInjectionTargets, addAuditLog, getCurrentUser } from",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/commands/run.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/portfolio.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/core/portfolio.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/core/portfolio.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import fs from 'fs'; import path from 'path'; import { scanProject } from './sca",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/core/portfolio.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/integrations/paddle.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/integrations/paddle.js:15`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/integrations/paddle.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch('https://api.paddle.com/notification-settings', { headers: { 'Authorization':",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/integrations/paddle.js",
"line": 15,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/integrations/providers/apple.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/integrations/providers/apple.js:44`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/integrations/providers/apple.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch('https://api.appstoreconnect.apple.com/v1/bundleIds?limit=1', { headers: { Aut",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/integrations/providers/apple.js",
"line": 44,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/integrations/stripe.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/integrations/stripe.js:28`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/integrations/stripe.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch('https://api.stripe.com/v1/webhook_endpoints?limit=10', { headers: { 'Authoriz",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/integrations/stripe.js",
"line": 28,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "devassets_list_projects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "devassets_resolve_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "devassets_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "devassets_scan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "devassets_export",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "devassets_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "devassets_audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "devassets_rotate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "devassets_add_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "devassets_identity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "devassets_doctor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "devassets_ci_snippet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "devassets_skills",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "devassets_find_secret",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "devassets_list_secrets",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_secrets\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "devassets_get_secret",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"get_secret\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "devassets_get_global_secret",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "devassets_set_global_secret",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "devassets_set_secret",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "025b8ae9d0c99800217faa87734ced7672747ecce9c9a5a459b51ce1a3d55a9a",
"stats": {
"tools": 19,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 3,
"medium": 3,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}