Devassets MCP Server
@hyphen-network/devassets
npm
v1.16.260719
Published by @hyphen-network — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/mcp/server.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/server.js:269`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , '/.gnupg', '/.aws', '/.config/gcloud']; const isSensitiveDotdir = sensitiveRoots.some(s => resolvedPath.includ
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/server.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/run.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/run.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from 'child_process'; import { getProject, resolveInjectionTargets, addAuditLog, getCurrentUser } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/run.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/portfolio.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/portfolio.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import fs from 'fs'; import path from 'path'; import { scanProject } from './sca
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/portfolio.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/integrations/paddle.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/integrations/paddle.js:15`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://api.paddle.com/notification-settings', { headers: { 'Authorization':
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/integrations/paddle.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/integrations/providers/apple.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/integrations/providers/apple.js:44`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch('https://api.appstoreconnect.apple.com/v1/bundleIds?limit=1', { headers: { Aut
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/integrations/providers/apple.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/integrations/stripe.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/integrations/stripe.js:28`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://api.stripe.com/v1/webhook_endpoints?limit=10', { headers: { 'Authoriz
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/integrations/stripe.js
Tools 19
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
devassets_get_secretreads sensitive datadevassets_list_secretsreads sensitive datadevassets_add_projectno sensitive capabilitydevassets_auditno sensitive capabilitydevassets_checkno sensitive capabilitydevassets_ci_snippetno sensitive capabilitydevassets_doctorno sensitive capabilitydevassets_exportno sensitive capabilitydevassets_find_secretno sensitive capabilitydevassets_get_global_secretno sensitive capability
Show 9 more tools ↓
devassets_healthno sensitive capabilitydevassets_identityno sensitive capabilitydevassets_list_projectsno sensitive capabilitydevassets_resolve_projectno sensitive capabilitydevassets_rotateno sensitive capabilitydevassets_scanno sensitive capabilitydevassets_set_global_secretno sensitive capabilitydevassets_set_secretno sensitive capabilitydevassets_skillsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.16.260719 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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