Heroku Platform — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@heroku/mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@heroku/mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "@heroku/mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 88,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (37 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/repl/heroku-cli-repl.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/repl/heroku-cli-repl.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/repl/heroku-cli-repl.js"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { EventEmitter } from 'node:events'; import * as pjson from '../../packag",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/repl/heroku-cli-repl.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/deploy-to-heroku.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/deploy-to-heroku.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/deploy-to-heroku.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { ValidatorResult } from 'jsonschema'; import { z } from 'zod'; import {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/deploy-to-heroku.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/plugin-detector.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/plugin-detector.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/plugin-detector.js"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; /** * Detects if a Heroku CLI plugin is installed * * @param pluginName - The",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/utils/plugin-detector.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/tarball.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/tarball.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/tarball.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import * as tar from 'tar-stream'; /** * Creates a compressed tarball (tar.gz)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/utils/tarball.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/deploy-to-heroku.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/deploy-to-heroku.js:247`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/deploy-to-heroku.js"
},
"evidence": "try { execSync(`git remote add heroku-${result.name} ${app.git_url}`, { cwd: rootUri }); }",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/tools/deploy-to-heroku.js",
"line": 247,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/utils/tarball.spec.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/utils/tarball.spec.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/tarball.spec.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { expect } from 'chai'; import { packSources, getSourceFilePaths } from '",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/utils/tarball.spec.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_addons",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_addon_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_addon",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_addon_services",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_addon_plans",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_ai_available_models",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "provision_ai_model",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "make_ai_inference",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_apps",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_app_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_app",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rename_app",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pg_psql",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"execute_sql\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "pg_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pg_ps",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pg_locks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pg_outliers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pg_credentials",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pg_kill",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pg_maintenance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pg_backups",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pg_upgrade",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deploy_to_heroku",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deploy_one_off_dyno",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_app_logs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "maintenance_on",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "maintenance_off",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pipelines_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pipelines_promote",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pipelines_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pipelines_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pipelines",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ps_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ps_scale",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ps_restart",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_private_spaces",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_teams",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "fb0d185a9011a3d0f9f4459dbfd5ab91bf2948b648455e42054c8a26e72fc76c",
"stats": {
"tools": 37,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 4,
"medium": 1,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}