Heroku Platform MCP Server
@heroku/mcp-server
npm
v1.2.7
Source verified
Published by heroku — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Official Heroku Platform MCP server for interacting with Heroku apps and platform resources.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 6 = 88. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/repl/heroku-cli-repl.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/repl/heroku-cli-repl.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { EventEmitter } from 'node:events'; import * as pjson from '../../packag
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/repl/heroku-cli-repl.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/deploy-to-heroku.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/deploy-to-heroku.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { ValidatorResult } from 'jsonschema'; import { z } from 'zod'; import {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/deploy-to-heroku.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/plugin-detector.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/plugin-detector.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; /** * Detects if a Heroku CLI plugin is installed * * @param pluginName - The
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/plugin-detector.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/tarball.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/tarball.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import * as tar from 'tar-stream'; /** * Creates a compressed tarball (tar.gz)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/tarball.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/deploy-to-heroku.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/deploy-to-heroku.js:247`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { execSync(`git remote add heroku-${result.name} ${app.git_url}`, { cwd: rootUri }); }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/deploy-to-heroku.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/utils/tarball.spec.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/utils/tarball.spec.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { expect } from 'chai'; import { packSources, getSourceFilePaths } from '
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/tarball.spec.js
Tools 37
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
pg_psqlreads sensitive datacreate_addonno sensitive capabilitycreate_appno sensitive capabilitydeploy_one_off_dynono sensitive capabilitydeploy_to_herokuno sensitive capabilityget_addon_infono sensitive capabilityget_app_infono sensitive capabilityget_app_logsno sensitive capabilitylist_addon_plansno sensitive capabilitylist_addon_servicesno sensitive capability
Show 27 more tools ↓
list_addonsno sensitive capabilitylist_ai_available_modelsno sensitive capabilitylist_appsno sensitive capabilitylist_private_spacesno sensitive capabilitylist_teamsno sensitive capabilitymaintenance_offno sensitive capabilitymaintenance_onno sensitive capabilitymake_ai_inferenceno sensitive capabilitypg_backupsno sensitive capabilitypg_credentialsno sensitive capabilitypg_infono sensitive capabilitypg_killno sensitive capabilitypg_locksno sensitive capabilitypg_maintenanceno sensitive capabilitypg_outliersno sensitive capabilitypg_psno sensitive capabilitypg_upgradeno sensitive capabilitypipelinesno sensitive capabilitypipelines_createno sensitive capabilitypipelines_infono sensitive capabilitypipelines_listno sensitive capabilitypipelines_promoteno sensitive capabilityprovision_ai_modelno sensitive capabilityps_listno sensitive capabilityps_restartno sensitive capabilityps_scaleno sensitive capabilityrename_appno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (37 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.7 latest |
B 88/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v1.2.6 |
B 88/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.2.5 |
B 88/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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