Macos Mcp Tools MCP Server
@hachitogo/macos-mcp-tools
npm
v0.3.0
Published by @hachitogo — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP servers for macOS: Apple Mail, Contacts, Notes, Memory, Messages, Calendar Events, and Reminders
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/lib/eventkit/cli-executor.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/lib/eventkit/cli-executor.ts:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eException } from 'node:child_process'; import { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import fs from 'node:fs'; import
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/lib/eventkit/cli-executor.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/lib/jxa.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/lib/jxa.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process" /** * Execute a JXA (JavaScript for Automation) script via osascript. * Args a
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/lib/jxa.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/servers/mail.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/servers/mail.ts:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process" import { homedir, tmpdir } from "node:os" import { existsSync, readFileSync, writ
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/servers/mail.ts
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([unread_emails, mark_emails_read, fetch_email_body, mark_emails_junk, mark_emails_not_junk, fetch_email_attachment, get_entry]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_email, forward_email, send_message]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [unread_emails, mark_emails_read, fetch_email_body, mark_emails_junk, mark_emails_not_junk, fetch_email_attachment, get_entry] → sinks [send_email, fo
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow unread_emails → send_email
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (swift/build.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`swift/build.mjs:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { exec } from 'node:child_process'; import { promises as fs } from 'node:fs'; import path from 'node:path'; import {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server swift/build.mjs
Tools 42
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
fetch_email_attachmentingests untrusted inputfetch_email_bodyingests untrusted inputforward_emailnetwork egressget_entryingests untrusted inputmark_emails_junkingests untrusted inputmark_emails_not_junkingests untrusted inputmark_emails_readingests untrusted inputsend_emailnetwork egresssend_messagenetwork egressunread_emailsingests untrusted input
Show 32 more tools ↓
append_to_noteno sensitive capabilitycalendar_calendarsno sensitive capabilitycalendar_eventsno sensitive capabilitycontacts_groupsno sensitive capabilitycontacts_peopleno sensitive capabilitycreate_entryno sensitive capabilitycreate_folderno sensitive capabilitycreate_noteno sensitive capabilitydelete_folderno sensitive capabilitydelete_noteno sensitive capabilityextract_email_linksno sensitive capabilityflag_emailsno sensitive capabilityget_messagesno sensitive capabilityget_noteno sensitive capabilityget_participantsno sensitive capabilitylist_chatsno sensitive capabilitylist_email_attachmentsno sensitive capabilitylist_foldersno sensitive capabilitylist_notesno sensitive capabilitymove_noteno sensitive capabilityquery_duration_sinceno sensitive capabilityquery_last_occurrenceno sensitive capabilityreminders_listsno sensitive capabilityreminders_subtasksno sensitive capabilityreminders_tasksno sensitive capabilityreply_emailno sensitive capabilitysearch_emailsno sensitive capabilitysearch_entriesno sensitive capabilitysearch_messagesno sensitive capabilitysearch_notesno sensitive capabilityupdate_entryno sensitive capabilityupdate_noteno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (42 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @hachitogo/macos-mcp-tools --onlineMore in AI, Memory & Reasoning
FDA device & vehicle recall risk for AI agents: recall history, MAUDE trend, risk score.
Open-source MCP server exposing Agent402.Tools' catalog — 500+ strong: 400+ self-hostable tools + 100 multi-tool skill packs (security-audit, trend-analysis, structured-scrape, decode-blob, forecasting-bake-off) for AI agents — browser, web search & answe
Zero-dependency MCP server that gives AI agents a self-updating project memory in AGENTS.md. Returns merge instructions instead of mutating state, so every change is a reviewable diff.
MCP Apps UI resources and server helpers for n8n
MCP server providing comprehensive access to BookStack knowledge management system
MCP server for tracking achievements with STAR methodology