Guqings Exo MCP Server
@guqings/exo
npm
v0.6.2
Published by @guqings — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Your exocortex. Ingest ChatGPT exports, PDFs, and files into a searchable knowledge base. Hybrid FTS5 + vector search. LLM-compiled knowledge pages. MCP server for Claude Code and Cursor.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/commands/sync.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/commands/sync.ts:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from "child_process"; // ── Content-hash mode helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/commands/sync.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/core/extractors/video.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/core/extractors/video.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { unlink } from "node:fs/promises"; import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; imp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/extractors/video.ts
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/commands/check-update.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/commands/check-update.ts:55`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch('https://registry.npmjs.org/@guqings%2fexo/latest', { signal: controller.signal,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/commands/check-update.ts
medium Tool "brain_unlink" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "brain_unlink" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "unlink" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool brain_unlink
low Mutating tool "brain_unlink" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "brain_unlink" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool brain_unlink
Tools 21
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
brain_unlinkwrites filesbrain_backlinksno sensitive capabilitybrain_deleteno sensitive capabilitybrain_exportno sensitive capabilitybrain_getno sensitive capabilitybrain_graphno sensitive capabilitybrain_healthno sensitive capabilitybrain_hybrid_searchno sensitive capabilitybrain_keyword_searchno sensitive capabilitybrain_linkno sensitive capability
Show 11 more tools ↓
brain_lintno sensitive capabilitybrain_listno sensitive capabilitybrain_putno sensitive capabilitybrain_searchno sensitive capabilitybrain_statsno sensitive capabilitybrain_tagno sensitive capabilitybrain_tagsno sensitive capabilitybrain_timelineno sensitive capabilitybrain_untagno sensitive capabilitybrain_versionsno sensitive capabilitycompile_inboxno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.6.2 latest |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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