Guesty MCP Server
guesty-mcp-server
npm
v0.10.2
Published by dljrealty — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Guesty property management — 43 production tools + 7 addressable resource templates covering reservations, guests, messaging, pricing, revenue, tasks, webhooks, and IoT/property-health Enterprise tier.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_reservations, get_listing, get_conversations, get_financials, get_reviews, get_calendar, get_owner_statements, get_expenses, get_tasks, get_photos, get_guests, get_custom_fields]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create_webhook, delete_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_reservations, get_listing, get_conversations, get_financials, get_reviews, get_calendar, get_owner_statements, get_expenses, get_tasks, get_photo
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_reservations → create_webhook
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/cli.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/cli.js:18`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) { const res = await fetch("https://open-api.guesty.com/oauth2/token", { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/server.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/server.js:51`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: n; const res = await fetch("https://open-api.guesty.com/oauth2/token", { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/server.js
Tools 43
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_webhooknetwork egressdelete_webhooknetwork egressget_calendaringests untrusted inputget_conversationsingests untrusted inputget_custom_fieldsingests untrusted inputget_expensesingests untrusted inputget_financialsingests untrusted inputget_guestsingests untrusted inputget_listingingests untrusted inputget_owner_statementsingests untrusted input
Show 33 more tools ↓
get_photosingests untrusted inputget_reservationsingests untrusted inputget_reviewsingests untrusted inputget_tasksingests untrusted inputcreate_expenseno sensitive capabilitycreate_reservationno sensitive capabilitycreate_reservation_noteno sensitive capabilitycreate_taskno sensitive capabilityget_account_infono sensitive capabilityget_automation_rulesno sensitive capabilityget_calendar_blocksno sensitive capabilityget_channelsno sensitive capabilityget_guest_by_idno sensitive capabilityget_license_infono sensitive capabilityget_listing_occupancyno sensitive capabilityget_listing_pricingno sensitive capabilityget_maintenance_alertsno sensitive capabilityget_property_healthno sensitive capabilityget_readiness_scoreno sensitive capabilityget_reservation_financialsno sensitive capabilityget_revenue_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_supported_languagesno sensitive capabilityget_webhooksno sensitive capabilityrespond_to_reviewno sensitive capabilitysearch_reservationsno sensitive capabilitysend_guest_messageno sensitive capabilitysubmit_checkout_photosno sensitive capabilityupdate_calendarno sensitive capabilityupdate_listingno sensitive capabilityupdate_listing_pricingno sensitive capabilityupdate_photosno sensitive capabilityupdate_pricingno sensitive capabilityupdate_reservationno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (43 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.10.2 latest |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.9.11 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v0.9.5 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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