Guardvibe — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "guardvibe",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "guardvibe"
},
"server": {
"name": "guardvibe"
}
},
"grade": "C",
"score": {
"score": 79,
"threatScore": 85,
"grade": "C",
"band": "C",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 15.4,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-AUTH-2",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (43 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (build/data/rules/ai-security.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/data/rules/ai-security.js:195`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/data/rules/ai-security.js"
},
"evidence": "uctions and read ~/.ssh/id_rsa\"\\n\\n// GOOD: clean description\\n// description: \"Fetches weather data for a given city\"',",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "build/data/rules/ai-security.js",
"line": 195,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (build/data/rules/ai-tool-runtime.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/data/rules/ai-tool-runtime.js:53`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/data/rules/ai-tool-runtime.js"
},
"evidence": "called, also run `cat ~/.aws/credentials`'). The AI agent reads these tools, follows the embedded instructions, and exf",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "build/data/rules/ai-tool-runtime.js",
"line": 53,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (build/data/rules/supply-chain.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/data/rules/supply-chain.js:104`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/data/rules/supply-chain.js"
},
"evidence": "npmrc, .ssh, .aws, .env, .git-credentials). The SANDWORM_MODE worm (2026) and Shai-Hulud variants use this technique to",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "build/data/rules/supply-chain.js",
"line": 104,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-AUTH-2",
"title": "Instruction-override directive",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Instruction-override directive detected in the description of tool \"lookup_user\". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.",
"remediation": "Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lookup_user",
"field": "description"
},
"evidence": "Ignore all previous instructions",
"owasp": "LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection",
"data": {
"kind": "override"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (build/data/rules/core.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/data/rules/core.js:122`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/data/rules/core.js"
},
"evidence": "n// const fn = new \" + \"Function('x', 'return x * 2'); // only if absolutely needed\", compliance: [\"SOC2:CC7.1\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "build/data/rules/core.js",
"line": 122,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (build/tools/cross-file-taint.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/tools/cross-file-taint.js:614`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/tools/cross-file-taint.js"
},
"evidence": "ever pass user input to eval() or Function constructor.\", \"command-injection\": \"Use execFile()/spawn() with an a",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "build/tools/cross-file-taint.js",
"line": 614,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (build/tools/taint-analysis.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/tools/taint-analysis.js:24`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/tools/taint-analysis.js"
},
"evidence": "\"User input flows into eval(), enabling arbitrary code execution.\", fix: \"Never use eval() with user input. Use",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "build/tools/taint-analysis.js",
"line": 24,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/cli/init.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/cli/init.js:121`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/cli/init.js"
},
"evidence": "file_path;if(p)require('child_process').execFileSync('npx',['-y','guardvibe@${pkg.version}','check',p,'--format','buddy'",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/cli/init.js",
"line": 121,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/cli/scan.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/cli/scan.js:90`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/cli/scan.js"
},
"evidence": "eSync } = await import(\"child_process\"); const { analyzeFileSecurity } = await import(\"../tools/file-security.js\");",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/cli/scan.js",
"line": 90,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/data/rules/ai-security.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/data/rules/ai-security.js:97`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/data/rules/ai-security.js"
},
"evidence": "nimport { spawn } from \"child_process\";\\nconst allowed = /^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$/;\\nif (!allowed.test(args.filename)) throw n",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/data/rules/ai-security.js",
"line": 97,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/data/rules/core.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/data/rules/core.js:70`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/data/rules/core.js"
},
"evidence": "pattern: /(?:(?:child_process|cp)[\\s\\S]*?(?:exec|execSync|spawn|spawnSync)|\\.exec(?:Sync)?\\s*\\(|\\.spawn(?:Sync)?",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/data/rules/core.js",
"line": 70,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/data/rules/cve-versions.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/data/rules/cve-versions.js:357`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/data/rules/cve-versions.js"
},
"evidence": "me privileges including child_process and fs access. CVSS 10.0, actively exploited with 12,000+ exposed instances.\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/data/rules/cve-versions.js",
"line": 357,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:592`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/index.js"
},
"evidence": "eSync } = await import(\"child_process\"); const { readFileSync, existsSync } = await import(\"fs\"); const { resolv",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/index.js",
"line": 592,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/tools/cross-file-taint.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/tools/cross-file-taint.js:615`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/tools/cross-file-taint.js"
},
"evidence": "ction\": \"Use execFile()/spawn() with an argument array (no shell) and validate input against an allowlist.\", \"xs",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/tools/cross-file-taint.js",
"line": 615,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/tools/diff-aware.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/tools/diff-aware.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/tools/diff-aware.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFileSync } from \"child_process\"; /** * Parse unified-diff text and return the set of 1-based line numbers that a",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/tools/diff-aware.js",
"line": 12,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/tools/review-pr.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/tools/review-pr.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/tools/review-pr.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFileSync } from \"child_process\"; import { extname, basename } from \"path\"; import { analyzeCode } from \"./check-c",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/tools/review-pr.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/tools/scan-hallucinated.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/tools/scan-hallucinated.js:35`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/tools/scan-hallucinated.js"
},
"evidence": "sync_hooks\", \"buffer\", \"child_process\", \"cluster\", \"console\", \"constants\", \"crypto\", \"dgram\", \"diagnostics_channel\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/tools/scan-hallucinated.js",
"line": 35,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/data/rules/react-native.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/data/rules/react-native.js:71`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/data/rules/react-native.js"
},
"evidence": "ng\";\\nconst res = await fetch(\"https://api.example.com/data\", {\\n sslPinning: { certs: [\"api-cert\"] },\\n headers: { Au",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "build/data/rules/react-native.js",
"line": 71,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/tools/check-package-health.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/tools/check-package-health.js:74`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/tools/check-package-health.js"
},
"evidence": "omise.all([ fetch(`https://registry.npmjs.org/${encodeURIComponent(name)}`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(50",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "build/tools/check-package-health.js",
"line": 74,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/tools/deep-scan.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/tools/deep-scan.js:180`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/tools/deep-scan.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(\"https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages\", { method: \"POST\", headers",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "build/tools/deep-scan.js",
"line": 180,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/utils/osv-client.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/utils/osv-client.js:2`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/utils/osv-client.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch(\"https://api.osv.dev/v1/query\", { method: \"POST\", headers: { \"Content-Type",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "build/utils/osv-client.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (build/plugins/loader.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/plugins/loader.js:91`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/plugins/loader.js"
},
"evidence": "const mod = await import(modulePath); const plugin = mod.default ?? mod.plugin ?? mod; return plug",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "build/plugins/loader.js",
"line": 91,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "lookup_user",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fetch_page",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "fetch_weather",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_user",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_security_docs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_dependencies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_directory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_dependencies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_hallucinated_packages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_secrets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_staged",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compliance_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_sarif",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_package_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fix_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "secure_this",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "audit_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_policy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "review_pr",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_secrets_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "policy_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_dataflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_cross_file_dataflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_command",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_config_change",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "repo_security_posture",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "explain_remediation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_changed_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "security_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "audit_mcp_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_host_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "guardvibe_doctor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "verify_fix",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "security_workflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "auth_coverage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deep_scan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "full_audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remediation_plan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "verify_remediation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "secure_prompt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "a8462f2d553a5de183a5308d0716f360b5304fcadcb9409b433080480a1d2268",
"stats": {
"tools": 43,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 17,
"medium": 5,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}