Guardianshield — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "guardianshield",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "guardianshield"
},
"server": {
"name": "guardianshield"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 92,
"threatScore": 99,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 1.2,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/guardianshield/patterns/common.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/guardianshield/patterns/common.py:45`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/guardianshield/patterns/common.py"
},
"evidence": "Code execution risk via eval() with non-literal argument.\", 0.7, [\"CWE-94\", \"CWE-95\"], ), ] # Remed",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/guardianshield/patterns/common.py",
"line": 45,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/guardianshield/patterns/javascript.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/guardianshield/patterns/javascript.py:95`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/guardianshield/patterns/javascript.py"
},
"evidence": "\"description\": \"Avoid new Function(). Use a safe parser or pre-compiled functions.\", \"before\": 'const fn = new",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/guardianshield/patterns/javascript.py",
"line": 95,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/guardianshield/patterns/php.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/guardianshield/patterns/php.py:137`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/guardianshield/patterns/php.py"
},
"evidence": "\"Code execution via eval() with variable input.\", 0.95, [\"CWE-94\", \"CWE-95\"], ), ( \"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/guardianshield/patterns/php.py",
"line": 137,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/guardianshield/triage.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/guardianshield/triage.py:217`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/guardianshield/triage.py"
},
"evidence": "angerous functions like eval(), exec(), pickle.loads(), \" \"or yaml.load() that can execute arbitrary code. W",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/guardianshield/triage.py",
"line": 217,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/guardianshield/deep_engine.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/guardianshield/deep_engine.py:304`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/guardianshield/deep_engine.py"
},
"evidence": "( re.compile(r\"child_process\\s*\\.\\s*exec\\w*\\s*\\(\"), \"child_process.exec\", FindingType.COMMAND_I",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/guardianshield/deep_engine.py",
"line": 304,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/guardianshield/patterns/javascript.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/guardianshield/patterns/javascript.py:27`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/guardianshield/patterns/javascript.py"
},
"evidence": "E-78) ( \"js_child_process_exec\", re.compile( r\"\"\"(?:child_process|exec|execSync|spawn|sp",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/guardianshield/patterns/javascript.py",
"line": 27,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/guardianshield/patterns/python.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/guardianshield/patterns/python.py:107`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/guardianshield/patterns/python.py"
},
"evidence": "mand injection risk via os.system().\", 0.85, [\"CWE-78\"], ), ( \"command_injection_subproc",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/guardianshield/patterns/python.py",
"line": 107,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/guardianshield/triage.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/guardianshield/triage.py:137`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/guardianshield/triage.py"
},
"evidence": "ess.Popen/call/run with shell=True and a command string that includes user-controlled variables\", \"os.system",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/guardianshield/triage.py",
"line": 137,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded Google API key in test/example/packaging (tests/test_secrets.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "A hardcoded Google API key (a client API key (restricted by referrer/quota, not a private secret)) appears in `tests/test_secrets.py:213`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_secrets.py"
},
"evidence": "Google API key: AIza…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "google-api-key",
"file": "tests/test_secrets.py",
"line": 213
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_deep_engine.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_deep_engine.py:57`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_deep_engine.py"
},
"evidence": "leaned.upper() result = eval(data) \"\"\" # Intentionally insecure — os.system with env var: PYTHON_CMD_INJECTION = \"\"\"\\ c",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "tests/test_deep_engine.py",
"line": 57,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_diff.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_diff.py:89`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_diff.py"
},
"evidence": "ress'); +const result = eval(userInput); module.exports = {}; \"\"\" CONTEXT_ONLY_DIFF = \"\"\"\\ diff --git a/utils.py b/uti",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "tests/test_diff.py",
"line": 89,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_engines.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_engines.py:21`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_engines.py"
},
"evidence": ": EVAL_CODE = \"result = eval(user_input)\" class DummyEngine: \"\"\"Minimal engine for testing the registry with a cus",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "tests/test_engines.py",
"line": 21,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_patterns.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_patterns.py:156`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_patterns.py"
},
"evidence": "code = 'const fn = new Function(\"return \" + userInput);' findings = scan_code(code, sensitivity=\"high\", lan",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "tests/test_patterns.py",
"line": 156,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_patterns_php.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_patterns_php.py:231`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_patterns_php.py"
},
"evidence": "\"\"\"Code execution via eval().\"\"\" def test_eval_with_var(self): code = 'eval($userCode);' findings",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "tests/test_patterns_php.py",
"line": 231,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_scanner.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_scanner.py:151`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_scanner.py"
},
"evidence": "\"\"Command injection via eval()/exec().\"\"\" def test_eval(self): code = 'result = eval(user_input)' f",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "tests/test_scanner.py",
"line": 151,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_core.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_core.py:51`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_core.py"
},
"evidence": "ty(shield): code = 'os.system(\"rm -rf \" + user_input)' findings = shield.scan_code(code) assert len(findings",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_core.py",
"line": 51,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_deep_engine.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_deep_engine.py:63`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_deep_engine.py"
},
"evidence": "= os.getenv(\"USER_CMD\") os.system(cmd) \"\"\" # Intentionally insecure — path traversal: PYTHON_PATH_TRAVERSAL = \"\"\"\\ file",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_deep_engine.py",
"line": 63,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_diff.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_diff.py:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_diff.py"
},
"evidence": "ocess def run(): + subprocess.call(user_input, shell=True) \"\"\" MULTI_FILE_DIFF = \"\"\"\\ diff --git a/app.py b/app.py",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_diff.py",
"line": 20,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_patterns.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_patterns.py:127`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_patterns.py"
},
"evidence": "(self): code = 'os.system(\"rm -rf \" + path)' findings = scan_code(code, sensitivity=\"high\", language=\"py",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_patterns.py",
"line": 127,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_patterns_go.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_patterns_go.py:498`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_patterns_go.py"
},
"evidence": "\\n\".join([ \"subprocess.call(cmd, shell=True)\", \"hashlib.md5(x)\", ]) findings = s",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_patterns_go.py",
"line": 498,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_patterns_ruby.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_patterns_ruby.py:179`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_patterns_ruby.py"
},
"evidence": "(self): code = 'exec(\"cat #{filename}\")' findings = scan_code(code, sensitivity=\"high\", language=\"ruby\")",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_patterns_ruby.py",
"line": 179,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"guardianshield\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "guardianshield"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "26cd136c46fc334f1317c1d198586e3f7a48c9c09b0e459806f01d9481d277e6",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 8,
"medium": 0,
"low": 13,
"info": 1
}
}
}