Guardianshield MCP Server
guardianshield
PyPI
v1.2.1
Published by sparkvibe-io — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Universal AI security layer - MCP server for code scanning, PII detection, prompt injection defense, secret detection, and audit logging
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Hardcoded Google API key in test/example/packaging MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 21
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/guardianshield/patterns/common.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/guardianshield/patterns/common.py:45`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Code execution risk via eval() with non-literal argument.", 0.7, ["CWE-94", "CWE-95"], ), ] # Remed
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/guardianshield/patterns/common.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/guardianshield/patterns/javascript.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/guardianshield/patterns/javascript.py:95`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "description": "Avoid new Function(). Use a safe parser or pre-compiled functions.", "before": 'const fn = new
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/guardianshield/patterns/javascript.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/guardianshield/patterns/php.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/guardianshield/patterns/php.py:137`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "Code execution via eval() with variable input.", 0.95, ["CWE-94", "CWE-95"], ), ( "
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/guardianshield/patterns/php.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/guardianshield/triage.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/guardianshield/triage.py:217`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: angerous functions like eval(), exec(), pickle.loads(), " "or yaml.load() that can execute arbitrary code. W
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/guardianshield/triage.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/guardianshield/deep_engine.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/guardianshield/deep_engine.py:304`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ( re.compile(r"child_process\s*\.\s*exec\w*\s*\("), "child_process.exec", FindingType.COMMAND_I
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/guardianshield/deep_engine.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/guardianshield/patterns/javascript.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/guardianshield/patterns/javascript.py:27`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: E-78) ( "js_child_process_exec", re.compile( r"""(?:child_process|exec|execSync|spawn|sp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/guardianshield/patterns/javascript.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/guardianshield/patterns/python.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/guardianshield/patterns/python.py:107`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: mand injection risk via os.system().", 0.85, ["CWE-78"], ), ( "command_injection_subproc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/guardianshield/patterns/python.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/guardianshield/triage.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/guardianshield/triage.py:137`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ess.Popen/call/run with shell=True and a command string that includes user-controlled variables", "os.system
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/guardianshield/triage.py
low Hardcoded Google API key in test/example/packaging (tests/test_secrets.py)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded Google API key (a client API key (restricted by referrer/quota, not a private secret)) appears in `tests/test_secrets.py:213`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: Google API key: AIza…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server tests/test_secrets.py
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_deep_engine.py)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_deep_engine.py:57`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: leaned.upper() result = eval(data) """ # Intentionally insecure — os.system with env var: PYTHON_CMD_INJECTION = """\ c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_deep_engine.py
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_diff.py)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_diff.py:89`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ress'); +const result = eval(userInput); module.exports = {}; """ CONTEXT_ONLY_DIFF = """\ diff --git a/utils.py b/uti
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_diff.py
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_engines.py)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_engines.py:21`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: : EVAL_CODE = "result = eval(user_input)" class DummyEngine: """Minimal engine for testing the registry with a cus
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_engines.py
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_patterns.py)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_patterns.py:156`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: code = 'const fn = new Function("return " + userInput);' findings = scan_code(code, sensitivity="high", lan
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_patterns.py
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_patterns_php.py)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_patterns_php.py:231`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: """Code execution via eval().""" def test_eval_with_var(self): code = 'eval($userCode);' findings
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_patterns_php.py
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_scanner.py)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_scanner.py:151`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ""Command injection via eval()/exec().""" def test_eval(self): code = 'result = eval(user_input)' f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_scanner.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_core.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_core.py:51`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ty(shield): code = 'os.system("rm -rf " + user_input)' findings = shield.scan_code(code) assert len(findings
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_core.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_deep_engine.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_deep_engine.py:63`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: = os.getenv("USER_CMD") os.system(cmd) """ # Intentionally insecure — path traversal: PYTHON_PATH_TRAVERSAL = """\ file
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_deep_engine.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_diff.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_diff.py:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ocess def run(): + subprocess.call(user_input, shell=True) """ MULTI_FILE_DIFF = """\ diff --git a/app.py b/app.py
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_diff.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_patterns.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_patterns.py:127`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: (self): code = 'os.system("rm -rf " + path)' findings = scan_code(code, sensitivity="high", language="py
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_patterns.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_patterns_go.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_patterns_go.py:498`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: \n".join([ "subprocess.call(cmd, shell=True)", "hashlib.md5(x)", ]) findings = s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_patterns_go.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_patterns_ruby.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_patterns_ruby.py:179`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: (self): code = 'exec("cat #{filename}")' findings = scan_code(code, sensitivity="high", language="ruby")
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_patterns_ruby.py
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 21 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan guardianshield --online --registry pypiMore in Security & Testing
The Stripe Agent Toolkit enables popular agent frameworks including LangChain and Vercel's AI SDK to integrate with Stripe APIs through function calling.
MCP (Model Context Protocol) server for AgentGate. Enables Claude and other MCP-compatible AI assistants to request approvals.
Scan any website for AI agent readiness, payment protocols, and discovery endpoints
MCP server for aigently security guardrails — reads static catalog-data JSON, zero API dependency
Governed threat modeling, code threat verification, traceability & compliance, as MCP tools.
Governed threat modeling, code threat verification, traceability & compliance, as MCP tools.