Graphmemory — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@graphmemory/server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@graphmemory/server"
},
"server": {
"name": "@graphmemory/server"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"file-write",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (60 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (dist/ui/assets/vendor-markdown-DngssFHR.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/ui/assets/vendor-markdown-DngssFHR.js:46`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/ui/assets/vendor-markdown-DngssFHR.js"
},
"evidence": "dowith3?|drop|dropwhile|eval(?:cmd)?|exactp|filter|fix|fixity|flip|float(?:_matrix|_pointer)|floor|fold[lr]1?|frac|free|",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "dist/ui/assets/vendor-markdown-DngssFHR.js",
"line": 46,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (dist/ui/assets/vendor-md-editor-DC6xr_29.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/ui/assets/vendor-md-editor-DC6xr_29.js:3`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/ui/assets/vendor-md-editor-DC6xr_29.js"
},
"evidence": "dowith3?|drop|dropwhile|eval(?:cmd)?|exactp|filter|fix|fixity|flip|float(?:_matrix|_pointer)|floor|fold[lr]1?|frac|free|",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "dist/ui/assets/vendor-md-editor-DC6xr_29.js",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/ui/assets/vendor-markdown-DngssFHR.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/ui/assets/vendor-markdown-DngssFHR.js:46`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/ui/assets/vendor-markdown-DngssFHR.js"
},
"evidence": "dowith3?|drop|dropwhile|eval(?:cmd)?|exactp|filter|fix|fixity|flip|float(?:_matrix|_pointer)|floor|fold[lr]1?|frac|free|",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/ui/assets/vendor-markdown-DngssFHR.js",
"line": 46,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/ui/assets/vendor-md-editor-DC6xr_29.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/ui/assets/vendor-md-editor-DC6xr_29.js:3`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/ui/assets/vendor-md-editor-DC6xr_29.js"
},
"evidence": "dowith3?|drop|dropwhile|eval(?:cmd)?|exactp|filter|fix|fixity|flip|float(?:_matrix|_pointer)|floor|fold[lr]1?|frac|free|",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/ui/assets/vendor-md-editor-DC6xr_29.js",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/index.js:530`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/index.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require('child_process'); const tarArgs = dirs.map(d => `-C \"${path_1.default.dirname(d.src)}\" \"${pat",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli/index.js",
"line": 530,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/ui/assets/vendor-markdown-DngssFHR.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/ui/assets/vendor-markdown-DngssFHR.js:46`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/ui/assets/vendor-markdown-DngssFHR.js"
},
"evidence": "ntryTitle|eval(?:uate)?|exec(?:ute)?|exit|file(?:name)?|fill(?:attrs)?|flist|fnc|function(?:list)?|global|goto|group(?:b",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/ui/assets/vendor-markdown-DngssFHR.js",
"line": 46,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/ui/assets/vendor-md-editor-DC6xr_29.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/ui/assets/vendor-md-editor-DC6xr_29.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/ui/assets/vendor-md-editor-DC6xr_29.js"
},
"evidence": "ntryTitle|eval(?:uate)?|exec(?:ute)?|exit|file(?:name)?|fill(?:attrs)?|flist|fnc|function(?:list)?|global|goto|group(?:b",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/ui/assets/vendor-md-editor-DC6xr_29.js",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"epics_unlink_task\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"epics_unlink_task\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"unlink\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "epics_unlink_task"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/graphs/code.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/graphs/code.js:232`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/graphs/code.js"
},
"evidence": "a.graph); graph.import(data.graph); log.info({ nodes: graph.order, edges: graph.size }, 'Loaded graph');",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/graphs/code.js",
"line": 232,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/graphs/docs.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/graphs/docs.js:179`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/graphs/docs.js"
},
"evidence": "a.graph); graph.import(data.graph); log.info({ nodes: graph.order, edges: graph.size }, 'Loaded graph');",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/graphs/docs.js",
"line": 179,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/graphs/file-index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/graphs/file-index.js:288`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/graphs/file-index.js"
},
"evidence": "a.graph); graph.import(data.graph); log.info({ nodes: graph.order, edges: graph.size }, 'Loaded graph');",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/graphs/file-index.js",
"line": 288,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/graphs/knowledge.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/graphs/knowledge.js:398`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/graphs/knowledge.js"
},
"evidence": "a.graph); graph.import(data.graph); if (needsReEmbed) { graph.forEachNode((id, attrs) => {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/graphs/knowledge.js",
"line": 398,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/graphs/skill.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/graphs/skill.js:542`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/graphs/skill.js"
},
"evidence": "a.graph); graph.import(data.graph); if (needsReEmbed) { graph.forEachNode((id, attrs) => {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/graphs/skill.js",
"line": 542,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/graphs/task.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/graphs/task.js:874`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/graphs/task.js"
},
"evidence": "a.graph); graph.import(data.graph); if (needsReEmbed) { graph.forEachNode((id, attrs) => {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/graphs/task.js",
"line": 874,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/ui/assets/vendor-react-Cts2Wj-s.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/ui/assets/vendor-react-Cts2Wj-s.js:11`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/ui/assets/vendor-react-Cts2Wj-s.js"
},
"evidence": "];try{let n=await d(()=>import(e.module),[]);return t[e.id]=n,n}catch(t){return console.error(`Error loading route modul",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/ui/assets/vendor-react-Cts2Wj-s.js",
"line": 11,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"epics_unlink_task\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"epics_unlink_task\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "epics_unlink_task"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "code_get_file_symbols",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "code_get_symbol",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "code_list_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "code_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "code_search_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "epics_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "epics_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "epics_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "epics_link_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "epics_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "epics_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "epics_unlink_task",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"unlink\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "epics_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_get_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "notes_add_attachment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "notes_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "notes_create_link",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "notes_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "notes_delete_link",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "notes_find_linked",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "notes_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "notes_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "notes_list_links",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "notes_remove_attachment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "notes_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "notes_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "skills_add_attachment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "skills_bump_usage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "skills_create_link",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "skills_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "skills_delete_link",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "skills_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "skills_find_linked",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "skills_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "skills_link",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "skills_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "skills_recall",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "skills_remove_attachment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "skills_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "skills_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tasks_add_attachment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tasks_bulk_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tasks_bulk_move",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tasks_bulk_priority",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tasks_create_link",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tasks_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tasks_delete_link",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tasks_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tasks_find_linked",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tasks_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tasks_link",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tasks_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tasks_move",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tasks_remove_attachment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tasks_reorder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tasks_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tasks_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "32f1c06298350d41f01a515b5de3b9e244d7c03f63fdb44c69c932340c5ea67c",
"stats": {
"tools": 60,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 7,
"medium": 8,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}