Graphmemory MCP Server
@graphmemory/server
npm
v1.9.5
Source verified
Published by graph-memory — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for semantic graph memory from markdown files
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 16
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (dist/ui/assets/vendor-markdown-DngssFHR.js)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`dist/ui/assets/vendor-markdown-DngssFHR.js:46`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: dowith3?|drop|dropwhile|eval(?:cmd)?|exactp|filter|fix|fixity|flip|float(?:_matrix|_pointer)|floor|fold[lr]1?|frac|free|
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/ui/assets/vendor-markdown-DngssFHR.js
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (dist/ui/assets/vendor-md-editor-DC6xr_29.js)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`dist/ui/assets/vendor-md-editor-DC6xr_29.js:3`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: dowith3?|drop|dropwhile|eval(?:cmd)?|exactp|filter|fix|fixity|flip|float(?:_matrix|_pointer)|floor|fold[lr]1?|frac|free|
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/ui/assets/vendor-md-editor-DC6xr_29.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/ui/assets/vendor-markdown-DngssFHR.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/ui/assets/vendor-markdown-DngssFHR.js:46`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: dowith3?|drop|dropwhile|eval(?:cmd)?|exactp|filter|fix|fixity|flip|float(?:_matrix|_pointer)|floor|fold[lr]1?|frac|free|
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/ui/assets/vendor-markdown-DngssFHR.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/ui/assets/vendor-md-editor-DC6xr_29.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/ui/assets/vendor-md-editor-DC6xr_29.js:3`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: dowith3?|drop|dropwhile|eval(?:cmd)?|exactp|filter|fix|fixity|flip|float(?:_matrix|_pointer)|floor|fold[lr]1?|frac|free|
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/ui/assets/vendor-md-editor-DC6xr_29.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/index.js:530`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); const tarArgs = dirs.map(d => `-C "${path_1.default.dirname(d.src)}" "${pat
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/ui/assets/vendor-markdown-DngssFHR.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/ui/assets/vendor-markdown-DngssFHR.js:46`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ntryTitle|eval(?:uate)?|exec(?:ute)?|exit|file(?:name)?|fill(?:attrs)?|flist|fnc|function(?:list)?|global|goto|group(?:b
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/ui/assets/vendor-markdown-DngssFHR.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/ui/assets/vendor-md-editor-DC6xr_29.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/ui/assets/vendor-md-editor-DC6xr_29.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ntryTitle|eval(?:uate)?|exec(?:ute)?|exit|file(?:name)?|fill(?:attrs)?|flist|fnc|function(?:list)?|global|goto|group(?:b
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/ui/assets/vendor-md-editor-DC6xr_29.js
medium Tool "epics_unlink_task" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "epics_unlink_task" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "unlink" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool epics_unlink_task
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/graphs/code.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/graphs/code.js:232`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: a.graph); graph.import(data.graph); log.info({ nodes: graph.order, edges: graph.size }, 'Loaded graph');
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/graphs/code.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/graphs/docs.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/graphs/docs.js:179`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: a.graph); graph.import(data.graph); log.info({ nodes: graph.order, edges: graph.size }, 'Loaded graph');
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/graphs/docs.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/graphs/file-index.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/graphs/file-index.js:288`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: a.graph); graph.import(data.graph); log.info({ nodes: graph.order, edges: graph.size }, 'Loaded graph');
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/graphs/file-index.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/graphs/knowledge.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/graphs/knowledge.js:398`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: a.graph); graph.import(data.graph); if (needsReEmbed) { graph.forEachNode((id, attrs) => {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/graphs/knowledge.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/graphs/skill.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/graphs/skill.js:542`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: a.graph); graph.import(data.graph); if (needsReEmbed) { graph.forEachNode((id, attrs) => {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/graphs/skill.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/graphs/task.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/graphs/task.js:874`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: a.graph); graph.import(data.graph); if (needsReEmbed) { graph.forEachNode((id, attrs) => {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/graphs/task.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/ui/assets/vendor-react-Cts2Wj-s.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/ui/assets/vendor-react-Cts2Wj-s.js:11`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ];try{let n=await d(()=>import(e.module),[]);return t[e.id]=n,n}catch(t){return console.error(`Error loading route modul
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/ui/assets/vendor-react-Cts2Wj-s.js
low Mutating tool "epics_unlink_task" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "epics_unlink_task" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool epics_unlink_task
Tools 60
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
code_list_filesreads sensitive dataepics_unlink_taskwrites filescode_get_file_symbolsno sensitive capabilitycode_get_symbolno sensitive capabilitycode_searchno sensitive capabilitycode_search_filesno sensitive capabilityepics_createno sensitive capabilityepics_deleteno sensitive capabilityepics_getno sensitive capabilityepics_link_taskno sensitive capability
Show 50 more tools ↓
epics_listno sensitive capabilityepics_searchno sensitive capabilityepics_updateno sensitive capabilityfiles_get_infono sensitive capabilityfiles_listno sensitive capabilityfiles_searchno sensitive capabilityget_contextno sensitive capabilitynotes_add_attachmentno sensitive capabilitynotes_createno sensitive capabilitynotes_create_linkno sensitive capabilitynotes_deleteno sensitive capabilitynotes_delete_linkno sensitive capabilitynotes_find_linkedno sensitive capabilitynotes_getno sensitive capabilitynotes_listno sensitive capabilitynotes_list_linksno sensitive capabilitynotes_remove_attachmentno sensitive capabilitynotes_searchno sensitive capabilitynotes_updateno sensitive capabilityskills_add_attachmentno sensitive capabilityskills_bump_usageno sensitive capabilityskills_createno sensitive capabilityskills_create_linkno sensitive capabilityskills_deleteno sensitive capabilityskills_delete_linkno sensitive capabilityskills_find_linkedno sensitive capabilityskills_getno sensitive capabilityskills_linkno sensitive capabilityskills_listno sensitive capabilityskills_recallno sensitive capabilityskills_remove_attachmentno sensitive capabilityskills_searchno sensitive capabilityskills_updateno sensitive capabilitytasks_add_attachmentno sensitive capabilitytasks_bulk_deleteno sensitive capabilitytasks_bulk_moveno sensitive capabilitytasks_bulk_priorityno sensitive capabilitytasks_createno sensitive capabilitytasks_create_linkno sensitive capabilitytasks_deleteno sensitive capabilitytasks_delete_linkno sensitive capabilitytasks_find_linkedno sensitive capabilitytasks_getno sensitive capabilitytasks_linkno sensitive capabilitytasks_listno sensitive capabilitytasks_moveno sensitive capabilitytasks_remove_attachmentno sensitive capabilitytasks_reorderno sensitive capabilitytasks_searchno sensitive capabilitytasks_updateno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (60 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.9.5 latest |
A 94/100 | 16 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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