Gramps MCP Server
gramps-mcp
PyPI
v1.0.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Gramps API + MCP Server + A2A Agent — genealogy (people/families/events/places/sources/media)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 2 = 98. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/generate_from_openapi.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/generate_from_openapi.py:420`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pi_client.py")] subprocess.run([ruff, "check", "--fix", "--quiet", *targets], check=False) subprocess.ru
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/generate_from_openapi.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/security_sanitizer.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/security_sanitizer.py:136`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["git", "ls-files", "--cached", "--others", "--exclude-standard"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/security_sanitizer.py
Tools 35
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
gramps_bookmarksno sensitive capabilitygramps_chatno sensitive capabilitygramps_citationsno sensitive capabilitygramps_configno sensitive capabilitygramps_dnano sensitive capabilitygramps_eventsno sensitive capabilitygramps_exportersno sensitive capabilitygramps_factsno sensitive capabilitygramps_familiesno sensitive capabilitygramps_filtersno sensitive capability
Show 25 more tools ↓
gramps_holidaysno sensitive capabilitygramps_importersno sensitive capabilitygramps_livingno sensitive capabilitygramps_mediano sensitive capabilitygramps_metadatano sensitive capabilitygramps_name_formatsno sensitive capabilitygramps_name_groupsno sensitive capabilitygramps_notesno sensitive capabilitygramps_oidcno sensitive capabilitygramps_peopleno sensitive capabilitygramps_placesno sensitive capabilitygramps_relationsno sensitive capabilitygramps_reportsno sensitive capabilitygramps_repositoriesno sensitive capabilitygramps_searchno sensitive capabilitygramps_sourcesno sensitive capabilitygramps_tagsno sensitive capabilitygramps_tasksno sensitive capabilitygramps_timelineno sensitive capabilitygramps_tokenno sensitive capabilitygramps_transactionsno sensitive capabilitygramps_translationsno sensitive capabilitygramps_treesno sensitive capabilitygramps_typesno sensitive capabilitygramps_usersno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (35 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 98/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan gramps-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in API Development
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