Google Workspace Unlimited — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "google-workspace-unlimited",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "google-workspace-unlimited"
},
"server": {
"name": "google-workspace-unlimited"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 87,
"threatScore": 98,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 2.22,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 0.6
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 0.25,
"appliedPenalty": 0.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 0.1,
"appliedPenalty": 0.12
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (61 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: export_and_download_presentation → list_drive_items → send_smart_email. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "export_and_download_presentation → list_drive_items → send_smart_email"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"fetch",
"export_and_download_presentation"
],
"sources": [
"list_drive_items"
],
"sinks": [
"send_smart_email"
],
"path": [
"export_and_download_presentation",
"list_drive_items",
"send_smart_email"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "export_and_download_presentation",
"to": "list_drive_items",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "list_drive_items",
"to": "send_smart_email",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (adapters/module_wrapper/domain_mixin.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`adapters/module_wrapper/domain_mixin.py:220`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "adapters/module_wrapper/domain_mixin.py"
},
"evidence": "y: result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-m\", \"pip\", \"install\", install_target],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "adapters/module_wrapper/domain_mixin.py",
"line": 220,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (config/qdrant_docker.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`config/qdrant_docker.py:65`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "config/qdrant_docker.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"docker\", \"info\"], capture_output=True, tim",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "config/qdrant_docker.py",
"line": 65,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (gmail/mjml_wrapper.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`gmail/mjml_wrapper.py:77`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "gmail/mjml_wrapper.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"mjml\", \"--stdin\", \"--stdout\"], input=mjml_source,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "gmail/mjml_wrapper.py",
"line": 77,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded Google API key in test/example/packaging (scripts/test_button_params.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "A hardcoded Google API key (a public Firebase/web API key) appears in `scripts/test_button_params.py:27`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/test_button_params.py"
},
"evidence": "Google API key: AIza…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "google-api-key",
"file": "scripts/test_button_params.py",
"line": 27
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded Google API key in test/example/packaging (scripts/test_cache_webhook_demo.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "A hardcoded Google API key (a public Firebase/web API key) appears in `scripts/test_cache_webhook_demo.py:23`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/test_cache_webhook_demo.py"
},
"evidence": "Google API key: AIza…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "google-api-key",
"file": "scripts/test_cache_webhook_demo.py",
"line": 23
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded Google API key in test/example/packaging (scripts/test_textparagraph_markdown.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "A hardcoded Google API key (a public Firebase/web API key) appears in `scripts/test_textparagraph_markdown.py:24`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/test_textparagraph_markdown.py"
},
"evidence": "Google API key: AIza…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "google-api-key",
"file": "scripts/test_textparagraph_markdown.py",
"line": 24
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded Google API key in test/example/packaging (scripts/test_variation_webhook_demo.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "A hardcoded Google API key (a public Firebase/web API key) appears in `scripts/test_variation_webhook_demo.py:23`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/test_variation_webhook_demo.py"
},
"evidence": "Google API key: AIza…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "google-api-key",
"file": "scripts/test_variation_webhook_demo.py",
"line": 23
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/test_v2_card_builder.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/test_v2_card_builder.py:96`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/test_v2_card_builder.py"
},
"evidence": "h}\", ] result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True) return result def main(): print(\"=",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/test_v2_card_builder.py",
"line": 96,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"google-workspace-unlimited\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "google-workspace-unlimited"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"fetch",
"export_and_download_presentation"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"list_drive_items"
],
"externalSink": [
"send_smart_email"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"export_and_download_presentation",
"list_drive_items",
"send_smart_email"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: export_and_download_presentation → list_drive_items → send_smart_email."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_things",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wrap_module",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_module_component",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_module_components",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_wrapped_modules",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_drive_items",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "create_drive_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "share_drive_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "manage_drive_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_drive_auth",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_form",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_questions_to_form",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_form",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_form_publish_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "publish_form_publicly",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_form_response",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_form_responses",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_form_questions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_calendars",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_calendar",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "move_events_between_calendars",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_messages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_messages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_gmail_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "draft_gmail_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reply_to_gmail_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "draft_gmail_reply",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forward_gmail_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "draft_gmail_forward",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gmail_draft_send",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gmail_draft_save",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gmail_draft_apply_edits",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gmail_draft_discard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_gmail_filters",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_gmail_filter",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_gmail_filter",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_gmail_filter",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "manage_gmail_label",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "modify_gmail_message_labels",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_gmail_thread_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fetch",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "send_smart_email",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_email\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_sentiment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "photos_batch_details",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "photos_performance_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_photos_albums",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_photo_details",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_photos_library_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_spreadsheets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_spreadsheet_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_sheet_values",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "modify_sheet_values",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_spreadsheet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_sheet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_presentation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_presentation_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_slide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_slide_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_and_download_presentation",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "d6b33e12f83956ee69b6e07c1cb7e69f9dda48e95de4df7347de318b6982b067",
"stats": {
"tools": 61,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 3,
"medium": 0,
"low": 5,
"info": 1
}
}
}