Google Cloud — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "google-cloud-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "google-cloud-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "google-cloud-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink",
"untrusted-input"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (39 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: storage_download_file → bigquery_run_query → storage_upload_file. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "storage_download_file → bigquery_run_query → storage_upload_file"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"storage_download_file"
],
"sources": [
"bigquery_run_query",
"logging_read_logs"
],
"sinks": [
"storage_upload_file"
],
"path": [
"storage_download_file",
"bigquery_run_query",
"storage_upload_file"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "storage_download_file",
"to": "bigquery_run_query",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "bigquery_run_query",
"to": "storage_upload_file",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (test_server.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`test_server.py:30`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "test_server.py"
},
"evidence": "try: __import__(package) print(f\" ✅ {package}\") except ImportError:",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "test_server.py",
"line": 30,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"storage_download_file"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"bigquery_run_query",
"logging_read_logs"
],
"externalSink": [
"storage_upload_file"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"storage_download_file",
"bigquery_run_query",
"storage_upload_file"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: storage_download_file → bigquery_run_query → storage_upload_file."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "bigquery_run_query",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"sql_query\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "bigquery_list_datasets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bigquery_create_dataset",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bigquery_get_dataset_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bigquery_load_csv_data",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bigquery_export_table",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bigquery_list_jobs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bigquery_cancel_job",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "storage_list_buckets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "storage_create_bucket",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "storage_list_objects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "storage_upload_file",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"upload_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "storage_download_file",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "storage_delete_object",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "storage_get_bucket_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "storage_generate_signed_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "storage_copy_object",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "storage_move_object",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "storage_enable_versioning",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "storage_get_bucket_size",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "storage_set_bucket_lifecycle",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "logging_write_log",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "logging_read_logs",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_logs\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "logging_list_logs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "logging_delete_log",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "logging_create_log_sink",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "logging_list_log_sinks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "logging_delete_log_sink",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "logging_export_logs_to_bigquery",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "logging_create_log_bucket",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compute_list_instances",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compute_create_instance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compute_delete_instance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compute_start_instance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compute_stop_instance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compute_restart_instance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compute_get_instance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compute_list_zones",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compute_wait_for_operation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "076b553dfee9b029f95371293e8e3431f6ca43838e6847fe3eadc384b900b0e9",
"stats": {
"tools": 39,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 0,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}