Google Cloud (lockon-n) MCP Server
google-cloud-mcp
PyPI
v1.0.0
Published by lockon-n — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
A comprehensive Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Google Cloud Platform services including BigQuery, Cloud Logging, Cloud Storage, and Compute Engine.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: storage_download_file → bigquery_run_query → storage_upload_file. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow storage_download_file → bigquery_run_query → storage_upload_file
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (test_server.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`test_server.py:30`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: __import__(package) print(f" ✅ {package}") except ImportError:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test_server.py
Tools 39
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
bigquery_run_queryreads sensitive datalogging_read_logsreads sensitive datastorage_download_fileingests untrusted inputstorage_upload_filenetwork egressbigquery_cancel_jobno sensitive capabilitybigquery_create_datasetno sensitive capabilitybigquery_export_tableno sensitive capabilitybigquery_get_dataset_infono sensitive capabilitybigquery_list_datasetsno sensitive capabilitybigquery_list_jobsno sensitive capability
Show 29 more tools ↓
bigquery_load_csv_datano sensitive capabilitycompute_create_instanceno sensitive capabilitycompute_delete_instanceno sensitive capabilitycompute_get_instanceno sensitive capabilitycompute_list_instancesno sensitive capabilitycompute_list_zonesno sensitive capabilitycompute_restart_instanceno sensitive capabilitycompute_start_instanceno sensitive capabilitycompute_stop_instanceno sensitive capabilitycompute_wait_for_operationno sensitive capabilitylogging_create_log_bucketno sensitive capabilitylogging_create_log_sinkno sensitive capabilitylogging_delete_logno sensitive capabilitylogging_delete_log_sinkno sensitive capabilitylogging_export_logs_to_bigqueryno sensitive capabilitylogging_list_log_sinksno sensitive capabilitylogging_list_logsno sensitive capabilitylogging_write_logno sensitive capabilitystorage_copy_objectno sensitive capabilitystorage_create_bucketno sensitive capabilitystorage_delete_objectno sensitive capabilitystorage_enable_versioningno sensitive capabilitystorage_generate_signed_urlno sensitive capabilitystorage_get_bucket_infono sensitive capabilitystorage_get_bucket_sizeno sensitive capabilitystorage_list_bucketsno sensitive capabilitystorage_list_objectsno sensitive capabilitystorage_move_objectno sensitive capabilitystorage_set_bucket_lifecycleno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (39 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan google-cloud-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Google Cloud 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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