Gong — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "gong-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "gong-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "gong-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 92,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/sync/ProcessPool.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/sync/ProcessPool.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/sync/ProcessPool.js"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { EventEmitter } from 'events'; import path from 'path'; import { promise",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/sync/ProcessPool.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/DatabaseImportTool.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/DatabaseImportTool.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/DatabaseImportTool.js"
},
"evidence": "; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { join } from 'path'; import { readdirS",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/DatabaseImportTool.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/SetupTool.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/SetupTool.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/SetupTool.js"
},
"evidence": "ort { spawnSync } from 'child_process'; import * as fs from 'fs'; import * as path from 'path'; import * as os from 'os'",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/SetupTool.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/UpdateTool.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/UpdateTool.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/UpdateTool.js"
},
"evidence": "import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { join, resolve } from 'path'; import {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/UpdateTool.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/PythonPathResolver.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/PythonPathResolver.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/PythonPathResolver.js"
},
"evidence": "; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execAsync = promisify(exec); /** * Util",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/utils/PythonPathResolver.js",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"gong-mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "gong-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "search_conversations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_customer_conversations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_prospect_conversations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_internal_conversations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_conversations_batch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_data_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "build_cache",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_cache_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "refresh_data",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clear_cache",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_operations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_recent_calls",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_to_obsidian",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"export_to\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_data_gaps",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_cache_progress",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "import_csv_to_database",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_database_import_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_database_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_calls",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vacuum_database",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_database_management_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "f4bae4c6fa0f43581dfd239283e160fc3514561419e216aef1b439f1b3c141b0",
"stats": {
"tools": 21,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 5,
"medium": 0,
"low": 0,
"info": 1
}
}
}