Gong (npm) MCP Server
gong-mcp
npm
v2.9.2
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for Gong.io - retrieve and analyze conversations with intelligent caching and search
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/sync/ProcessPool.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/sync/ProcessPool.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { EventEmitter } from 'events'; import path from 'path'; import { promise
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/sync/ProcessPool.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/DatabaseImportTool.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/DatabaseImportTool.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { join } from 'path'; import { readdirS
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/DatabaseImportTool.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/SetupTool.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/SetupTool.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from 'child_process'; import * as fs from 'fs'; import * as path from 'path'; import * as os from 'os'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/SetupTool.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/UpdateTool.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/UpdateTool.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { join, resolve } from 'path'; import {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/UpdateTool.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/PythonPathResolver.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/PythonPathResolver.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execAsync = promisify(exec); /** * Util
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/PythonPathResolver.js
Tools 21
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
export_to_obsidiannetwork egressanalyze_data_gapsno sensitive capabilitybuild_cacheno sensitive capabilitycheck_data_statusno sensitive capabilitycheck_database_import_statusno sensitive capabilityclear_cacheno sensitive capabilitydelete_callsno sensitive capabilityget_cache_progressno sensitive capabilityget_cache_statsno sensitive capabilityget_database_management_statsno sensitive capability
Show 11 more tools ↓
get_database_statsno sensitive capabilityget_recent_callsno sensitive capabilityimport_csv_to_databaseno sensitive capabilitymemory_operationsno sensitive capabilityrefresh_datano sensitive capabilitysearch_conversationsno sensitive capabilitysearch_conversations_batchno sensitive capabilitysearch_customer_conversationsno sensitive capabilitysearch_internal_conversationsno sensitive capabilitysearch_prospect_conversationsno sensitive capabilityvacuum_databaseno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.9.2 latest |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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