Conoha Vps — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "@gmo-internet/conoha-vps-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@gmo-internet/conoha-vps-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@gmo-internet/conoha-vps-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 90,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (18 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:2870`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "Function(\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 2870
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"url\" on \"fetch_url\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"fetch_url\" takes a URL/host parameter \"url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "fetch_url",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.url"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "url"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"conoha_get\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"conoha_get\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "conoha_get",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"conoha_get_by_param\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"conoha_get_by_param\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "conoha_get_by_param",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"conoha_post\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"conoha_post\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "conoha_post",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"conoha_post_put\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"conoha_post_put\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "conoha_post_put",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"conoha_post_put_by_param\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"conoha_post_put_by_param\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "conoha_post_put_by_param",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"conoha_post_by_header_param\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"conoha_post_by_header_param\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "conoha_post_by_header_param",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"conoha_delete_by_param\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"conoha_delete_by_param\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "conoha_delete_by_param",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"conoha_head\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"conoha_head\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "conoha_head",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "create_container",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_container",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_objects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upload_object",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_object",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_container_public_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "enable_web_publish",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "disable_web_publish",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fetch_url",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch_url\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "encode_base64",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "conoha_get",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "conoha_get_by_param",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "conoha_post",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "conoha_post_put",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "conoha_post_put_by_param",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "conoha_post_by_header_param",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "conoha_delete_by_param",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "conoha_head",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "03b1995b22f0c5886caf7d0b7c0693475c392519bfaf7def3d453669fd729b80",
"stats": {
"tools": 18,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 1,
"low": 8,
"info": 0
}
}
}