Conoha Vps MCP Server
@gmo-internet/conoha-vps-mcp
npm
v0.6.1
Source verified
Published by gmo-internet — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 10 = 90. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| ✓ | publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:2870`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Function("
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "fetch_url"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "fetch_url" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool fetch_url · inputSchema.properties.url
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "conoha_get"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "conoha_get" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool conoha_get · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "conoha_get_by_param"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "conoha_get_by_param" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool conoha_get_by_param · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "conoha_post"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "conoha_post" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool conoha_post · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "conoha_post_put"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "conoha_post_put" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool conoha_post_put · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "conoha_post_put_by_param"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "conoha_post_put_by_param" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool conoha_post_put_by_param · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "conoha_post_by_header_param"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "conoha_post_by_header_param" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool conoha_post_by_header_param · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "conoha_delete_by_param"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "conoha_delete_by_param" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool conoha_delete_by_param · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "conoha_head"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "conoha_head" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool conoha_head · inputSchema.properties.path
Tools 18
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
conoha_delete_by_paramreads sensitive dataconoha_getreads sensitive dataconoha_get_by_paramreads sensitive dataconoha_headreads sensitive dataconoha_postreads sensitive dataconoha_post_by_header_paramreads sensitive dataconoha_post_putreads sensitive dataconoha_post_put_by_paramreads sensitive datafetch_urlingests untrusted inputcreate_containerno sensitive capabilitydelete_containerno sensitive capabilitydelete_objectno sensitive capabilitydisable_web_publishno sensitive capabilityenable_web_publishno sensitive capabilityencode_base64no sensitive capabilityget_container_public_stateno sensitive capabilitylist_objectsno sensitive capabilityupload_objectno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (18 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.6.1 latest |
A 90/100 | 10 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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