Gitmem MCP Server

gitmem-mcp npm v1.6.6

Published by gitmem-dev — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.

Trust grade
D
62/100
Last scanned
Trust
D · 62/100
How safe the published surface and source look. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
D Why this grade 100 − 38.5 = 62/100

Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−38.5 Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code ×3 MTC-SRC-008 exfiltration

Grade capped: 3 confirmed high findings → grade capped at D. A hard gate overrides the point total — no amount of clean surface buys back a confirmed catastrophe.

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.

Findings 5

high Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code (dist/commands/deactivate.js)MTC-SRC-008

A live-looking JSON Web Token is hardcoded in `dist/commands/deactivate.js:15`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.

Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)

Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.

Location: server dist/commands/deactivate.js

high Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code (dist/services/feedback-remote.js)MTC-SRC-008

A live-looking JSON Web Token is hardcoded in `dist/services/feedback-remote.js:9`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.

Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)

Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.

Location: server dist/services/feedback-remote.js

high Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code (dist/services/license.js)MTC-SRC-008

A live-looking JSON Web Token is hardcoded in `dist/services/license.js:26`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.

Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)

Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.

Location: server dist/services/license.js

medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/commands/activate.js)MTC-SRC-003

In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/activate.js:190`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: fetch(`https://api.supabase.com/v1/projects/${projectRef}/database/query`

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/commands/activate.js

medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/commands/check.js)MTC-SRC-003

In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/check.js:158`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: fetch("https://api.openai.com/v1/models"

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/commands/check.js

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.6.6 latest D 62/100 5 1.5.0 2026-07-22

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MCP Trust Score: D · 62/100
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The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan gitmem-mcp --online

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