Git Repository Manager — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "github-mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "github-mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "github-mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 87,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (31 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/advanced/common.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/advanced/common.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/advanced/common.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); /** * Get current repository information */ fu",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/advanced/common.js",
"line": 6,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/advanced/gbackup.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/advanced/gbackup.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/advanced/gbackup.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); function executeGitCommand(command, description)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/advanced/gbackup.js",
"line": 17,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/advanced/gclean.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/advanced/gclean.js:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/advanced/gclean.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require('child_process'); const readline = require('readline'); function executeGitCommand(command, desc",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/advanced/gclean.js",
"line": 18,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/advanced/gdev.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/advanced/gdev.js:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/advanced/gdev.js"
},
"evidence": "st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); // Get command line arguments const args = proce",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/advanced/gdev.js",
"line": 20,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/advanced/gfix.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/advanced/gfix.js:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/advanced/gfix.js"
},
"evidence": "st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); // Get command line arguments const args = proce",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/advanced/gfix.js",
"line": 20,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/advanced/gflow.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/advanced/gflow.js:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/advanced/gflow.js"
},
"evidence": "st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); // Get command line arguments const args = proce",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/advanced/gflow.js",
"line": 18,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/advanced/gfresh.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/advanced/gfresh.js:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/advanced/gfresh.js"
},
"evidence": "st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); // Get the directory where this script is locate",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/advanced/gfresh.js",
"line": 19,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/advanced/glist.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/advanced/glist.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/advanced/glist.js"
},
"evidence": "st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); // Enhanced tool information with categories, ex",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/advanced/glist.js",
"line": 16,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/advanced/gquick.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/advanced/gquick.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/advanced/gquick.js"
},
"evidence": "st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); // Colors for better output const colors = { r",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/advanced/gquick.js",
"line": 13,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/advanced/grelease.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/advanced/grelease.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/advanced/grelease.js"
},
"evidence": "st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const fs = require('fs'); const path = require('path'); // Get command line ar",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/advanced/grelease.js",
"line": 21,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (bin/advanced/gworkflow.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/advanced/gworkflow.js:108`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/advanced/gworkflow.js"
},
"evidence": "try { execSync(`git rev-parse --verify ${branch}`, { stdio: 'pipe' }); return branch;",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "bin/advanced/gworkflow.js",
"line": 108,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "github-mcp-server",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-add-all",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-remove",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-remove-all",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-commit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-push",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-pull",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-branch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-checkout",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-log",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-stash",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-stash-pop",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-reset",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-clone",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-init",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-remote-list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-remote-add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-remote-remove",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-remote-set-url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-flow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-quick-commit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-sync",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-tag",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-merge",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-rebase",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-cherry-pick",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-blame",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git-bisect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "ba4407604fee7c8507b58fd24d9da9ba143dd3654b62ef303cea32c2940cb08a",
"stats": {
"tools": 31,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 10,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}