Git Repository Manager (jungchihoon) MCP Server
github-mcp-server
npm
v1.8.7
Published by jungchihoon — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Comprehensive Git repository management for AI assistants, with 29 Git operations and 11 workflow combinations.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/advanced/common.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/advanced/common.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); /** * Get current repository information */ fu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/advanced/common.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/advanced/gbackup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/advanced/gbackup.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); function executeGitCommand(command, description)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/advanced/gbackup.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/advanced/gclean.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/advanced/gclean.js:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); const readline = require('readline'); function executeGitCommand(command, desc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/advanced/gclean.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/advanced/gdev.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/advanced/gdev.js:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); // Get command line arguments const args = proce
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/advanced/gdev.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/advanced/gfix.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/advanced/gfix.js:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); // Get command line arguments const args = proce
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/advanced/gfix.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/advanced/gflow.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/advanced/gflow.js:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); // Get command line arguments const args = proce
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/advanced/gflow.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/advanced/gfresh.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/advanced/gfresh.js:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); // Get the directory where this script is locate
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/advanced/gfresh.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/advanced/glist.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/advanced/glist.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); // Enhanced tool information with categories, ex
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/advanced/glist.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/advanced/gquick.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/advanced/gquick.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); // Colors for better output const colors = { r
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/advanced/gquick.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/advanced/grelease.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/advanced/grelease.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const fs = require('fs'); const path = require('path'); // Get command line ar
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/advanced/grelease.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (bin/advanced/gworkflow.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`bin/advanced/gworkflow.js:108`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { execSync(`git rev-parse --verify ${branch}`, { stdio: 'pipe' }); return branch;
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/advanced/gworkflow.js
Tools 31
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
git-addno sensitive capabilitygit-add-allno sensitive capabilitygit-bisectno sensitive capabilitygit-blameno sensitive capabilitygit-branchno sensitive capabilitygit-checkoutno sensitive capabilitygit-cherry-pickno sensitive capabilitygit-cloneno sensitive capabilitygit-commitno sensitive capabilitygit-diffno sensitive capability
Show 21 more tools ↓
git-flowno sensitive capabilitygit-initno sensitive capabilitygit-logno sensitive capabilitygit-mergeno sensitive capabilitygit-pullno sensitive capabilitygit-pushno sensitive capabilitygit-quick-commitno sensitive capabilitygit-rebaseno sensitive capabilitygit-remote-addno sensitive capabilitygit-remote-listno sensitive capabilitygit-remote-removeno sensitive capabilitygit-remote-set-urlno sensitive capabilitygit-removeno sensitive capabilitygit-remove-allno sensitive capabilitygit-resetno sensitive capabilitygit-stashno sensitive capabilitygit-stash-popno sensitive capabilitygit-statusno sensitive capabilitygit-syncno sensitive capabilitygit-tagno sensitive capabilitygithub-mcp-serverno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (31 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.8.7 latest |
B 87/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan github-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Git Repository Manager 27
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 28 side by side →
Experimental package — This module provides a set of MCP tools to retrieve information from GitHub
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A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for GitHub repository analysis and file reading
MCP server for GitHub repository operations with CLI token support
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