Git Commands — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "git-commands-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "git-commands-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "git-commands-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 89,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec",
"untrusted-input"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (27 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: git_lfs_fetch → git_read_files → git_hooks. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "git_lfs_fetch → git_read_files → git_hooks"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"git_lfs_fetch"
],
"sources": [
"git_read_files"
],
"sinks": [
"git_hooks"
],
"path": [
"git_lfs_fetch",
"git_read_files",
"git_hooks"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "git_lfs_fetch",
"to": "git_read_files",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "git_read_files",
"to": "git_hooks",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"git_hooks\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"git_hooks\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"script\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "git_hooks"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/handlers/common.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/handlers/common.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/handlers/common.js"
},
"evidence": "; import { exec } from \"child_process\"; import { promisify } from \"util\"; import { cloneRepo, getDirectoryTree } from \".",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/handlers/common.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"script\" on \"git_hooks\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"git_hooks\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"script\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "git_hooks",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.script"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "script"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"git_hooks\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"git_hooks\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "git_hooks"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"file_paths\" on \"git_read_files\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"git_read_files\" takes a path parameter \"file_paths\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "git_read_files",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.file_paths"
},
"data": {
"param": "file_paths"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"git_lfs_fetch"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"git_read_files"
],
"externalSink": [
"git_hooks"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"git_lfs_fetch",
"git_read_files",
"git_hooks"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: git_lfs_fetch → git_read_files → git_hooks."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "git_directory_structure",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_read_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "git_branch_diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_checkout_branch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_delete_branch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_merge_branch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_commit_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_commits_details",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_commit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_track",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_local_changes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_search_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_push",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_pull",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_stash",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_create_tag",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_rebase",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_reset",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_archive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_attributes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_blame",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_clean",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_hooks",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"script\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "git_lfs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_lfs_fetch",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "git_revert",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "4b39e52189d1eae888992c407bfbab5119565145a3f0864ee71b8094e5620870",
"stats": {
"tools": 27,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 2,
"medium": 1,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}