Git Commands MCP Server
git-commands-mcp
npm
v0.1.4
Published by bsreeram08 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: git_lfs_fetch → git_read_files → git_hooks. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow git_lfs_fetch → git_read_files → git_hooks
high Tool "git_hooks" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "git_hooks" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool git_hooks
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/handlers/common.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/handlers/common.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from "child_process"; import { promisify } from "util"; import { cloneRepo, getDirectoryTree } from ".
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/handlers/common.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "git_hooks"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "git_hooks" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool git_hooks · inputSchema.properties.script
low Mutating tool "git_hooks" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "git_hooks" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool git_hooks
low Unconstrained path parameter "file_paths" on "git_read_files"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "git_read_files" takes a path parameter "file_paths" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool git_read_files · inputSchema.properties.file_paths
Tools 27
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
git_hooksruns code / shellgit_lfs_fetchingests untrusted inputgit_read_filesreads sensitive datagit_archiveno sensitive capabilitygit_attributesno sensitive capabilitygit_blameno sensitive capabilitygit_branch_diffno sensitive capabilitygit_checkout_branchno sensitive capabilitygit_cleanno sensitive capabilitygit_commitno sensitive capability
Show 17 more tools ↓
git_commit_historyno sensitive capabilitygit_commits_detailsno sensitive capabilitygit_configno sensitive capabilitygit_create_tagno sensitive capabilitygit_delete_branchno sensitive capabilitygit_directory_structureno sensitive capabilitygit_lfsno sensitive capabilitygit_local_changesno sensitive capabilitygit_merge_branchno sensitive capabilitygit_pullno sensitive capabilitygit_pushno sensitive capabilitygit_rebaseno sensitive capabilitygit_resetno sensitive capabilitygit_revertno sensitive capabilitygit_search_codeno sensitive capabilitygit_stashno sensitive capabilitygit_trackno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (27 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.4 latest |
B 89/100 | 6 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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