Frontrun — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "frontrun-mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "frontrun-mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "frontrun-mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 83,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (36 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`index.js:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "index.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from 'child_process'; // ============================================================ // --setup: One",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "index.js",
"line": 18,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([frontrun_company_resources]) co-exist with external-action tools ([frontrun_create_webhook, frontrun_delete_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "frontrun_company_resources → frontrun_create_webhook"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [frontrun_company_resources] → sinks [frontrun_create_webhook, frontrun_delete_webhook]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"frontrun_company_resources"
],
"sinks": [
"frontrun_create_webhook",
"frontrun_delete_webhook"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (index.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`index.js:58`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "index.js"
},
"evidence": "ns in the README. execSync(`claude mcp add frontrun --scope user -e FRONTRUN_API_KEY=${apiKey} -- npx frontrun-mcp",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "index.js",
"line": 58,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"frontrun_company_resources"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"frontrun_create_webhook",
"frontrun_delete_webhook"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "trending_teaser",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_feedback",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_list_tracked",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_track",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_untrack",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_preview",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_new_follows",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_snapshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_enriched_follows",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_convergence",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_trending",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_thesis_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_classify",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_create_rule",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_list_rules",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_update_rule",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_delete_rule",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_tag",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_list_tags",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_company",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_company_founders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_founders_batch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_company_signals",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_company_resources",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"scrape\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_company_funding",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_vc_activity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_vc_similar",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_feed",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_sectors",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_discover",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_reports",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_list_webhooks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_create_webhook",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "frontrun_delete_webhook",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "571885eb1cff1d41929e81cbbb6c84673911447348b3f5e340018b9fe01e5b87",
"stats": {
"tools": 36,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 2,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}