Frontrun MCP Server
frontrun-mcp-server
npm
v2.7.0
Published by jongall45 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Frontrun MCP Server - VC follow signal intelligence, company research, and deal discovery for AI agents. 35 tools.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 11 = 83. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`index.js:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; // ============================================================ // --setup: One
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server index.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([frontrun_company_resources]) co-exist with external-action tools ([frontrun_create_webhook, frontrun_delete_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [frontrun_company_resources] → sinks [frontrun_create_webhook, frontrun_delete_webhook]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow frontrun_company_resources → frontrun_create_webhook
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (index.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`index.js:58`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ns in the README. execSync(`claude mcp add frontrun --scope user -e FRONTRUN_API_KEY=${apiKey} -- npx frontrun-mcp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server index.js
Tools 36
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
frontrun_company_resourcesingests untrusted inputfrontrun_create_webhooknetwork egressfrontrun_delete_webhooknetwork egressfrontrun_classifyno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_companyno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_company_foundersno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_company_fundingno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_company_signalsno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_convergenceno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_create_ruleno sensitive capability
Show 26 more tools ↓
frontrun_delete_ruleno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_discoverno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_enriched_followsno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_feedno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_founders_batchno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_list_rulesno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_list_tagsno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_list_trackedno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_list_webhooksno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_new_followsno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_previewno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_reportsno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_searchno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_sectorsno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_snapshotno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_statusno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_tagno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_thesis_searchno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_trackno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_trendingno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_untrackno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_update_ruleno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_vc_activityno sensitive capabilityfrontrun_vc_similarno sensitive capabilitysend_feedbackno sensitive capabilitytrending_teaserno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (36 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.7.0 latest |
B 83/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.6.1 |
B 83/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
v2.6.0 |
B 83/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
v2.5.2 |
B 83/100 | 3 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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