Fluxmail — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.7.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.7.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.7"
},
"target": {
"id": "fluxmail",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "fluxmail"
},
"server": {
"name": "fluxmail"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 91,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "moderate",
"label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.7"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (17 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([get_email, get_thread, download_attachment]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_email, cancel_scheduled_email, forward_email]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"get_email",
"get_thread",
"download_attachment"
],
"sinks": [
"send_email",
"cancel_scheduled_email",
"forward_email"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/accounts/microsoftAuth.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/accounts/microsoftAuth.js:92`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/accounts/microsoftAuth.js"
},
"evidence": "fetch('https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me?$select=mail,userPrincipalName,displayName'",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/accounts/microsoftAuth.js",
"line": 92
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/storage/db.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/storage/db.js:487`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/storage/db.js"
},
"evidence": "exec(`VACUUM INTO '${",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/storage/db.js",
"line": 487
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"get_email",
"get_thread",
"download_attachment"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"send_email",
"cancel_scheduled_email",
"forward_email"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_accounts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_folders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_labels",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_emails",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_emails",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_email",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_thread",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "create_draft",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_draft",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_draft",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_email",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_email\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_scheduled_emails",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cancel_scheduled_email",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_email\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "forward_email",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"forward\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "modify_emails",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "download_attachment",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "34dcf9a3726c2c2191a4c4e5e75c2fa24de4e34aeb20842f7a095299eb8a08b9",
"stats": {
"tools": 17,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 3,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}