Fluxmail MCP Server
fluxmail
npm
v0.8.0
Source verified
Published by churichard — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Self-hosted email API with MCP and REST support for Gmail, Outlook, and IMAP/SMTP
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 3 = 97. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_email, get_thread, download_attachment]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_email, cancel_scheduled_email, forward_email]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_email, get_thread, download_attachment] → sinks [send_email, cancel_scheduled_email, forward_email]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_email → send_email
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/accounts/microsoftAuth.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/accounts/microsoftAuth.js:104`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me?$select=mail,userPrincipalName,displayName', {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/accounts/microsoftAuth.js
Tools 17
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
cancel_scheduled_emailnetwork egressdownload_attachmentingests untrusted inputforward_emailnetwork egressget_emailingests untrusted inputget_threadingests untrusted inputsend_emailnetwork egresscreate_draftno sensitive capabilitydelete_draftno sensitive capabilityget_statusno sensitive capabilitylist_accountsno sensitive capability
Show 7 more tools ↓
list_emailsno sensitive capabilitylist_foldersno sensitive capabilitylist_labelsno sensitive capabilitylist_scheduled_emailsno sensitive capabilitymodify_emailsno sensitive capabilitysearch_emailsno sensitive capabilityupdate_draftno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (17 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.8.0 latest |
A 97/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.7.0 |
A 97/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v0.6.1 |
A 97/100 | 2 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
v0.6.0 |
A 91/100 | 3 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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