Figbridge — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "figbridge-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "figbridge-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "figbridge-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (51 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
"title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([get_tokens]) and tools that can send data out ([run_script]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
"remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "get_tokens → run_script"
},
"evidence": "sources [get_tokens] → sinks [run_script]",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"sources": [
"get_tokens"
],
"sinks": [
"run_script"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"run_script\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"run_script\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"run_script\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "run_script"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/browser.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/browser.js:490`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/browser.js"
},
"evidence": "urn await page.evaluate(new Function(`return (async () => { ${script} })()`)); } finally { try { await page.close(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/browser.js",
"line": 490,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/doctor.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/doctor.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/doctor.js"
},
"evidence": "_execFile } from \"node:child_process\"; import { promisify } from \"node:util\"; import http from \"node:http\"; const execF",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/doctor.js",
"line": 11,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/init.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/init.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/init.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { fileURLToPath } from \"node:url\"; const GREEN = \"\\x1b[32m\"; const YELLO",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/init.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"run_script\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"run_script\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "run_script"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"get_tokens"
],
"externalSink": [
"run_script"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"get_tokens",
"run_script"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: get_tokens → run_script."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get_current_selection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_last_export",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_tokens",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"get_token\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "bridge_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "select_node",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_node",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_screens",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_components",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "describe_screen",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_app_spec",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clone_screen",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "recolor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply_tokens",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_assets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lint_ds",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "import_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "import_responsive_set",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "import_url_batch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "verify_text_fidelity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "screenshot_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "visual_diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fingerprint_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "audit_interactions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_import",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "audit_mobile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "measure_fidelity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "audit_regression",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "match_mockup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "map_components",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "measure_layout",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "demarcate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "diff_images",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "diff_specs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "probe_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "diff_to_source",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_patch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "audit_palette",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "audit_typography",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "audit_a11y",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "audit_whitespace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_frame",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "import_from_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_from_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_script",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"run_script\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "delete_node",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_agent_bundle",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_pages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_frames",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_all_pages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "diff_since",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "7b73bf7011d7b228a1201f74125557769b1f3b38462f7b46a6e02e95ba782dfb",
"stats": {
"tools": 51,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 5,
"medium": 0,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}