Figbridge MCP Server
figbridge-mcp
npm
v0.4.0
Source verified
Published by rudraptpsingh — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Free, local MCP bridge for Figbridge — exposes Figma → HTML/CSS/Tailwind/tokens to AI agents.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([get_tokens]) and tools that can send data out ([run_script]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [get_tokens] → sinks [run_script]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow get_tokens → run_script
high Tool "run_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_script" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_script
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/browser.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/browser.js:490`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: urn await page.evaluate(new Function(`return (async () => { ${script} })()`)); } finally { try { await page.close(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/browser.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/doctor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/doctor.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: _execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import http from "node:http"; const execF
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/doctor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/init.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/init.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; const GREEN = "\x1b[32m"; const YELLO
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/init.js
low Mutating tool "run_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_script
Tools 51
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_tokensreads sensitive datarun_scriptruns code / shellapply_tokensno sensitive capabilityaudit_a11yno sensitive capabilityaudit_interactionsno sensitive capabilityaudit_mobileno sensitive capabilityaudit_paletteno sensitive capabilityaudit_regressionno sensitive capabilityaudit_typographyno sensitive capabilityaudit_whitespaceno sensitive capability
Show 41 more tools ↓
bridge_statusno sensitive capabilityclone_screenno sensitive capabilitydelete_nodeno sensitive capabilitydemarcateno sensitive capabilitydescribe_screenno sensitive capabilitydiff_imagesno sensitive capabilitydiff_sinceno sensitive capabilitydiff_specsno sensitive capabilitydiff_to_sourceno sensitive capabilityexport_all_pagesno sensitive capabilityexport_app_specno sensitive capabilityexport_frameno sensitive capabilityexport_nodeno sensitive capabilityfingerprint_urlno sensitive capabilitygenerate_patchno sensitive capabilityget_agent_bundleno sensitive capabilityget_current_selectionno sensitive capabilityget_last_exportno sensitive capabilityimport_from_codeno sensitive capabilityimport_responsive_setno sensitive capabilityimport_urlno sensitive capabilityimport_url_batchno sensitive capabilitylint_dsno sensitive capabilitylist_assetsno sensitive capabilitylist_componentsno sensitive capabilitylist_framesno sensitive capabilitylist_historyno sensitive capabilitylist_pagesno sensitive capabilitylist_screensno sensitive capabilitymap_componentsno sensitive capabilitymatch_mockupno sensitive capabilitymeasure_fidelityno sensitive capabilitymeasure_layoutno sensitive capabilitypreflight_importno sensitive capabilityprobe_urlno sensitive capabilityrecolorno sensitive capabilityscreenshot_urlno sensitive capabilityselect_nodeno sensitive capabilityupdate_from_codeno sensitive capabilityverify_text_fidelityno sensitive capabilityvisual_diffno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (51 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan figbridge-mcp --onlineMore in Design & Media
Turn designs into shipped parts: quote 3D printing, CNC, and decals, then check out.
Aleph's official SiliconFlow media-generation MCP server (image / video / TTS)
MCP server for image generation using Google Gemini AI
Ambience AI MCP Server - Generate images, videos, and audio through Model Context Protocol
MCP server exposing every endpoint of the AstroWay Calculation API as tools — natal, synastry, transits, Vedic dashas, Tarot, Numerology, Human Design, AI horoscopes — for Claude Desktop, Cursor and any MCP-compatible AI agent.
Audio-guide and trip-planning tools for 1,100+ cities from Audiala. Free, no API key.