Universal Blockchain — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@expertvagabond/universal-blockchain-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@expertvagabond/universal-blockchain-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@expertvagabond/universal-blockchain-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 92,
"threatScore": 99,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 1.2,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (56 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from 'child_process'; class ZetaChainMCPServer { server; testMode; constructor() {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/smithery.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/smithery.js:53`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/smithery.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require('child_process'); execSync('zetachain --version', { stdio: 'ignore' }); c",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/smithery.js",
"line": 53,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/index.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/index.ts:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/index.ts"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { testModeResponses } from './test-mode",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/index.ts",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/smithery.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/smithery.ts:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/smithery.ts"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from 'child_process'; // Session configuration schema for Smithery (JSON Schema Draft 07) export cons",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/smithery.ts",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([get_balances, get_fees]) co-exist with external-action tools ([withdraw_tokens, cross_chain_send, nft_mint]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "get_balances → withdraw_tokens"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [get_balances, get_fees] → sinks [withdraw_tokens, cross_chain_send, nft_mint]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"get_balances",
"get_fees"
],
"sinks": [
"withdraw_tokens",
"cross_chain_send",
"nft_mint"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:176`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch('https://zetachain-athens-evm.blockpi.network/v1/rpc/public', { method: 'P",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 176,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/index.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/index.ts:205`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/index.ts"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch('https://zetachain-athens-evm.blockpi.network/v1/rpc/public', { method: 'POST',",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/index.ts",
"line": 205,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"metadata_uri\" on \"nft_mint\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"nft_mint\" takes a URL/host parameter \"metadata_uri\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "nft_mint",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.metadata_uri"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "metadata_uri"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/__tests__/index.test.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/__tests__/index.test.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/__tests__/index.test.js"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from 'child_process'; // Mock the child_process module jest.mock('child_process'); const mockSpawn = s",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/__tests__/index.test.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/__tests__/index.test.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/__tests__/index.test.ts:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/__tests__/index.test.ts"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from 'child_process'; // Mock the child_process module jest.mock('child_process'); const mockSpawn =",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/__tests__/index.test.ts",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"@expertvagabond/universal-blockchain-mcp\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.",
"remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@expertvagabond/universal-blockchain-mcp"
},
"evidence": "npm run install-zetachain && npm run install-foundry",
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"scripts": [
"postinstall"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"get_balances",
"get_fees"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"withdraw_tokens",
"cross_chain_send",
"nft_mint"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "create_account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "import_account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_accounts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "show_account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_balances",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "query_cctx",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_fees",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "call_contract",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "withdraw_tokens",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"parameter \"recipient\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "withdraw_and_call",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_tokens",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_chains",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "request_faucet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_network_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_foundry",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_build",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_test",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_verify",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_call",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_send",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_balance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_nonce",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_gas_price",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_block",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_tx",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "anvil_start",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "anvil_snapshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "anvil_revert",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeta_validator_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeta_governance_vote",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeta_governance_proposals",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeta_staking_delegate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeta_staking_rewards",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cross_chain_send",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"parameter \"recipient\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "cross_chain_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "contract_compile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "contract_deploy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "contract_interact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "defi_swap",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "defi_liquidity_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "defi_yield_farm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nft_mint",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"parameter \"recipient\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "nft_transfer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nft_metadata",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "block_explorer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gas_tracker",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "portfolio_tracker",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "security_audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wallet_export",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wallet_backup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "transaction_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gas_optimizer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "multisig_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bridge_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "714f80b35ae8da5ecc3d61f644cd95bfe7451e2050120c45e2a4b606c3ac2783",
"stats": {
"tools": 56,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 4,
"medium": 4,
"low": 3,
"info": 0
}
}
}