Universal Blockchain (expertvagabond) MCP Server
@expertvagabond/universal-blockchain-mcp
npm
v1.0.1
Published by @expertvagabond — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Universal Blockchain MCP server for cross-chain development with ZetaChain, Foundry, and multi-chain support. Supports both remote (demo) and local (full functionality) deployment.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; class ZetaChainMCPServer { server; testMode; constructor() {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/smithery.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/smithery.js:53`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); execSync('zetachain --version', { stdio: 'ignore' }); c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/smithery.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/index.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/index.ts:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { testModeResponses } from './test-mode
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/index.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/smithery.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/smithery.ts:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; // Session configuration schema for Smithery (JSON Schema Draft 07) export cons
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/smithery.ts
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_balances, get_fees]) co-exist with external-action tools ([withdraw_tokens, cross_chain_send, nft_mint]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_balances, get_fees] → sinks [withdraw_tokens, cross_chain_send, nft_mint]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_balances → withdraw_tokens
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:176`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://zetachain-athens-evm.blockpi.network/v1/rpc/public', { method: 'P
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/index.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/index.ts:205`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://zetachain-athens-evm.blockpi.network/v1/rpc/public', { method: 'POST',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/index.ts
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "metadata_uri" on "nft_mint"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "nft_mint" takes a URL/host parameter "metadata_uri" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool nft_mint · inputSchema.properties.metadata_uri
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/__tests__/index.test.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/__tests__/index.test.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; // Mock the child_process module jest.mock('child_process'); const mockSpawn = s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/__tests__/index.test.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/__tests__/index.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/__tests__/index.test.ts:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; // Mock the child_process module jest.mock('child_process'); const mockSpawn =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/__tests__/index.test.ts
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@expertvagabond/universal-blockchain-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: npm run install-zetachain && npm run install-foundry
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @expertvagabond/universal-blockchain-mcp
Tools 56
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
cross_chain_sendnetwork egressget_balancesingests untrusted inputget_feesingests untrusted inputnft_mintnetwork egresswithdraw_tokensnetwork egressanvil_revertno sensitive capabilityanvil_snapshotno sensitive capabilityanvil_startno sensitive capabilityblock_explorerno sensitive capabilitybridge_statusno sensitive capability
Show 46 more tools ↓
call_contractno sensitive capabilitycast_balanceno sensitive capabilitycast_blockno sensitive capabilitycast_callno sensitive capabilitycast_gas_priceno sensitive capabilitycast_nonceno sensitive capabilitycast_sendno sensitive capabilitycast_txno sensitive capabilitycheck_foundryno sensitive capabilitycontract_compileno sensitive capabilitycontract_deployno sensitive capabilitycontract_interactno sensitive capabilitycreate_accountno sensitive capabilitycreate_projectno sensitive capabilitycross_chain_statusno sensitive capabilitydefi_liquidity_addno sensitive capabilitydefi_swapno sensitive capabilitydefi_yield_farmno sensitive capabilityforge_buildno sensitive capabilityforge_createno sensitive capabilityforge_testno sensitive capabilityforge_verifyno sensitive capabilitygas_optimizerno sensitive capabilitygas_trackerno sensitive capabilityget_network_infono sensitive capabilityimport_accountno sensitive capabilitylist_accountsno sensitive capabilitylist_chainsno sensitive capabilitylist_tokensno sensitive capabilitymultisig_createno sensitive capabilitynft_metadatano sensitive capabilitynft_transferno sensitive capabilityportfolio_trackerno sensitive capabilityquery_cctxno sensitive capabilityrequest_faucetno sensitive capabilitysecurity_auditno sensitive capabilityshow_accountno sensitive capabilitytransaction_historyno sensitive capabilitywallet_backupno sensitive capabilitywallet_exportno sensitive capabilitywithdraw_and_callno sensitive capabilityzeta_governance_proposalsno sensitive capabilityzeta_governance_voteno sensitive capabilityzeta_staking_delegateno sensitive capabilityzeta_staking_rewardsno sensitive capabilityzeta_validator_createno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (56 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @expertvagabond/universal-blockchain-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Universal Blockchain 1
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