Exarp — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "exarp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "exarp"
},
"server": {
"name": "exarp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (51 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (project_management_automation/middleware/path_validation.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`project_management_automation/middleware/path_validation.py:68`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "project_management_automation/middleware/path_validation.py"
},
"evidence": "r\"\\.aws\", r\"id_rsa\", r\"\\.pem$\", r\"secrets?\\.ya?ml\", ] self._compiled",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "project_management_automation/middleware/path_validation.py",
"line": 68,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (project_management_automation/server.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`project_management_automation/server.py:112`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "project_management_automation/server.py"
},
"evidence": "S credentials r\"id_rsa\", # SSH private keys r\"\\.pem$\", # Certificate files r\"secrets?\\.ya?ml\",",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "project_management_automation/server.py",
"line": 112,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (project_management_automation/utils/security.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`project_management_automation/utils/security.py:65`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "project_management_automation/utils/security.py"
},
"evidence": "GPG keys r'id_rsa', # SSH private keys r'\\.pem$', # Certificate files",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "project_management_automation/utils/security.py",
"line": 65,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (project_management_automation/resources/catalog.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`project_management_automation/resources/catalog.py:215`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "project_management_automation/resources/catalog.py"
},
"evidence": "y: result = subprocess.run( [linter, '--version'], capture_output=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "project_management_automation/resources/catalog.py",
"line": 215,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (project_management_automation/server.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`project_management_automation/server.py:3385`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "project_management_automation/server.py"
},
"evidence": "rompt() def exec() -> str: \"\"\"Executive/Stakeholder workflow for strategic view.\"\"\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "project_management_automation/server.py",
"line": 3385,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (project_management_automation/tools/batch_task_approval.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`project_management_automation/tools/batch_task_approval.py:87`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "project_management_automation/tools/batch_task_approval.py"
},
"evidence": "preview_result = subprocess.run( preview_cmd, cwd=str(project_root),",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "project_management_automation/tools/batch_task_approval.py",
"line": 87,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (project_management_automation/tools/codeql_security.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`project_management_automation/tools/codeql_security.py:233`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "project_management_automation/tools/codeql_security.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( ['git', 'remote', 'get-url', 'origin'], capture_output=T",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "project_management_automation/tools/codeql_security.py",
"line": 233,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (project_management_automation/scripts/automate_daily.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`project_management_automation/scripts/automate_daily.py:247`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "project_management_automation/scripts/automate_daily.py"
},
"evidence": "pt result = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=T",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "project_management_automation/scripts/automate_daily.py",
"line": 247,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (project_management_automation/scripts/automate_dependency_security.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`project_management_automation/scripts/automate_dependency_security.py:173`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "project_management_automation/scripts/automate_dependency_security.py"
},
"evidence": "result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=300) if result.retu",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "project_management_automation/scripts/automate_dependency_security.py",
"line": 173,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (project_management_automation/scripts/automate_docs_health_v2.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`project_management_automation/scripts/automate_docs_health_v2.py:168`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "project_management_automation/scripts/automate_docs_health_v2.py"
},
"evidence": "result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, str(self.project_root / 'scripts' / 'valida",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "project_management_automation/scripts/automate_docs_health_v2.py",
"line": 168,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (project_management_automation/scripts/automate_run_tests.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`project_management_automation/scripts/automate_run_tests.py:129`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "project_management_automation/scripts/automate_run_tests.py"
},
"evidence": "md)}\") result = subprocess.run( cmd, cwd=str(self.project_root), capture_out",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "project_management_automation/scripts/automate_run_tests.py",
"line": 129,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (project_management_automation/scripts/automate_sprint.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`project_management_automation/scripts/automate_sprint.py:400`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "project_management_automation/scripts/automate_sprint.py"
},
"evidence": "es result = subprocess.run( ['git', 'log', '--pretty=format:%s', '-50'], cwd",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "project_management_automation/scripts/automate_sprint.py",
"line": 400,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (project_management_automation/scripts/automate_test_coverage.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`project_management_automation/scripts/automate_test_coverage.py:136`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "project_management_automation/scripts/automate_test_coverage.py"
},
"evidence": ")] result = subprocess.run( cmd, cwd=str(self.project_root),",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "project_management_automation/scripts/automate_test_coverage.py",
"line": 136,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"exarp\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "exarp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "my_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_prompts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "infer_session_mode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_external_tool_hints",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "automation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tool_catalog",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "workflow_mode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "recommend",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_alignment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "security",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "setup_hooks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prompt_tracking",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_attribution",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "task_analysis",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "testing",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lint",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "task_discovery",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "task_workflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "estimation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_maint",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_task_commits_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_branch_commits_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_branches_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_branch_tasks_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compare_task_diff_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_graph_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "merge_branch_tools_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_task_branch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "server_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "auto_prime_session",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_task_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_mlx_status_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_mlx_hardware_info_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_mlx_models_tool",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "generate_with_mlx_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_code_documentation_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_code_quality_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "enhance_context_summary_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_ollama_status_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_hardware_info_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_ollama_models_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_with_ollama_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pull_ollama_model_tool",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "exarp_session_handoff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "task_assignee_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "bac71fe0f21c719c337db0087c2f929f2038cf8e9b7f6135ab70612321d82865",
"stats": {
"tools": 51,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 7,
"medium": 0,
"low": 6,
"info": 1
}
}
}