Exarp MCP Server
exarp
PyPI
v0.2.2
Published by davidl71 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for project management automation - health scores, task alignment, security scanning
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (project_management_automation/middleware/path_validation.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`project_management_automation/middleware/path_validation.py:68`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: r"\.aws", r"id_rsa", r"\.pem$", r"secrets?\.ya?ml", ] self._compiled
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server project_management_automation/middleware/path_validation.py
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (project_management_automation/server.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`project_management_automation/server.py:112`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: S credentials r"id_rsa", # SSH private keys r"\.pem$", # Certificate files r"secrets?\.ya?ml",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server project_management_automation/server.py
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (project_management_automation/utils/security.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`project_management_automation/utils/security.py:65`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: GPG keys r'id_rsa', # SSH private keys r'\.pem$', # Certificate files
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server project_management_automation/utils/security.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (project_management_automation/resources/catalog.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`project_management_automation/resources/catalog.py:215`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( [linter, '--version'], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server project_management_automation/resources/catalog.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (project_management_automation/server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`project_management_automation/server.py:3385`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rompt() def exec() -> str: """Executive/Stakeholder workflow for strategic view."""
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server project_management_automation/server.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (project_management_automation/tools/batch_task_approval.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`project_management_automation/tools/batch_task_approval.py:87`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: preview_result = subprocess.run( preview_cmd, cwd=str(project_root),
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server project_management_automation/tools/batch_task_approval.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (project_management_automation/tools/codeql_security.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`project_management_automation/tools/codeql_security.py:233`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ['git', 'remote', 'get-url', 'origin'], capture_output=T
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server project_management_automation/tools/codeql_security.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (project_management_automation/scripts/automate_daily.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`project_management_automation/scripts/automate_daily.py:247`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pt result = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=T
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server project_management_automation/scripts/automate_daily.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (project_management_automation/scripts/automate_dependency_security.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`project_management_automation/scripts/automate_dependency_security.py:173`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=300) if result.retu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server project_management_automation/scripts/automate_dependency_security.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (project_management_automation/scripts/automate_docs_health_v2.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`project_management_automation/scripts/automate_docs_health_v2.py:168`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, str(self.project_root / 'scripts' / 'valida
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server project_management_automation/scripts/automate_docs_health_v2.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (project_management_automation/scripts/automate_run_tests.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`project_management_automation/scripts/automate_run_tests.py:129`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: md)}") result = subprocess.run( cmd, cwd=str(self.project_root), capture_out
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server project_management_automation/scripts/automate_run_tests.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (project_management_automation/scripts/automate_sprint.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`project_management_automation/scripts/automate_sprint.py:400`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: es result = subprocess.run( ['git', 'log', '--pretty=format:%s', '-50'], cwd
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server project_management_automation/scripts/automate_sprint.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (project_management_automation/scripts/automate_test_coverage.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`project_management_automation/scripts/automate_test_coverage.py:136`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: )] result = subprocess.run( cmd, cwd=str(self.project_root),
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server project_management_automation/scripts/automate_test_coverage.py
Tools 51
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
list_mlx_models_toolingests untrusted inputpull_ollama_model_toolingests untrusted inputadd_external_tool_hintsno sensitive capabilityanalyze_alignmentno sensitive capabilityanalyze_code_quality_toolno sensitive capabilityauto_prime_sessionno sensitive capabilityautomationno sensitive capabilitycheck_attributionno sensitive capabilitycheck_mlx_status_toolno sensitive capabilitycheck_ollama_status_toolno sensitive capability
Show 41 more tools ↓
compare_task_diff_toolno sensitive capabilitycontextno sensitive capabilityenhance_context_summary_toolno sensitive capabilityestimationno sensitive capabilityexarp_session_handoffno sensitive capabilityfind_promptsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_code_documentation_toolno sensitive capabilitygenerate_configno sensitive capabilitygenerate_graph_toolno sensitive capabilitygenerate_with_mlx_toolno sensitive capabilitygenerate_with_ollama_toolno sensitive capabilityget_branch_commits_toolno sensitive capabilityget_branch_tasks_toolno sensitive capabilityget_hardware_info_toolno sensitive capabilityget_mlx_hardware_info_toolno sensitive capabilityget_task_commits_toolno sensitive capabilityget_task_contextno sensitive capabilityhealthno sensitive capabilityinfer_session_modeno sensitive capabilitylintno sensitive capabilitylist_branches_toolno sensitive capabilitylist_ollama_models_toolno sensitive capabilitymemoryno sensitive capabilitymemory_maintno sensitive capabilitymerge_branch_tools_toolno sensitive capabilitymy_toolno sensitive capabilityprompt_trackingno sensitive capabilityrecommendno sensitive capabilityreportno sensitive capabilityscan_filesno sensitive capabilitysecurityno sensitive capabilityserver_statusno sensitive capabilityset_task_branchno sensitive capabilitysetup_hooksno sensitive capabilitytask_analysisno sensitive capabilitytask_assignee_toolno sensitive capabilitytask_discoveryno sensitive capabilitytask_workflowno sensitive capabilitytestingno sensitive capabilitytool_catalogno sensitive capabilityworkflow_modeno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (51 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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