Entroly — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "entroly",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "entroly"
},
"server": {
"name": "entroly"
}
},
"grade": "C",
"score": {
"score": 70,
"threatScore": 77,
"grade": "C",
"band": "C",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 16.6,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 6.3,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-AUTH-2",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (62 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (entroly/ravs/executors.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`entroly/ravs/executors.py:221`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "entroly/ravs/executors.py"
},
"evidence": "eval( ",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "entroly/ravs/executors.py",
"line": 221
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"record_command_exit\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"record_command_exit\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"subprocess\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "record_command_exit"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (entroly/ravs/executors.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`entroly/ravs/executors.py:221`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "entroly/ravs/executors.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "entroly/ravs/executors.py",
"line": 221
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (entroly/cli.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`entroly/cli.py:239`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "entroly/cli.py"
},
"evidence": "urllib.request.urlopen(\n \"https://pypi.org/pypi/entroly/json\"",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "entroly/cli.py",
"line": 239
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (entroly-wasm/js/cli.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`entroly-wasm/js/cli.js:264`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "entroly-wasm/js/cli.js"
},
"evidence": "require(gwPath)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "entroly-wasm/js/cli.js",
"line": 264
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"title": "Unsafe deserialization (entroly/server.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`entroly/server.py:3980`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "entroly/server.py"
},
"evidence": "pickle.loads(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
"file": "entroly/server.py",
"line": 3980
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"record_command_exit\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"record_command_exit\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "record_command_exit"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-AUTH-2",
"title": "Instruction-override directive",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Instruction-override directive detected in the description of tool \"security_scan\". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.",
"remediation": "Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "security_scan",
"field": "description"
},
"evidence": "ignore previous instructions",
"owasp": "LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection",
"data": {
"kind": "override"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (bench/fix_nb6.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`bench/fix_nb6.py:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bench/fix_nb6.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bench/fix_nb6.py",
"line": 31
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (bench/quality_eval.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`bench/quality_eval.py:162`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bench/quality_eval.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bench/quality_eval.py",
"line": 162
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/agentic_task_miner.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/agentic_task_miner.py:43`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "benchmarks/agentic_task_miner.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "benchmarks/agentic_task_miner.py",
"line": 43
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/audited_runner.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/audited_runner.py:90`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "benchmarks/audited_runner.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.check_output(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "benchmarks/audited_runner.py",
"line": 90
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/coding_tasks.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/coding_tasks.py:86`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "benchmarks/coding_tasks.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "benchmarks/coding_tasks.py",
"line": 86
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/compression_frontier.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/compression_frontier.py:526`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "benchmarks/compression_frontier.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "benchmarks/compression_frontier.py",
"line": 526
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/compression_gauntlet.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/compression_gauntlet.py:441`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "benchmarks/compression_gauntlet.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "benchmarks/compression_gauntlet.py",
"line": 441
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/compression_latency.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/compression_latency.py:317`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "benchmarks/compression_latency.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "benchmarks/compression_latency.py",
"line": 317
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/conformal_calibrate.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/conformal_calibrate.py:82`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "benchmarks/conformal_calibrate.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.check_output(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "benchmarks/conformal_calibrate.py",
"line": 82
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/eicv_baseline.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/eicv_baseline.py:111`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "benchmarks/eicv_baseline.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.check_output(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "benchmarks/eicv_baseline.py",
"line": 111
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"entroly\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "entroly"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "retrieve_compressed_span",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_compressed_spans",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_compression_receipts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remember_fragment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "optimize_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "entroly_retrieve",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "recall_relevant",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_outcome",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_test_result",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_command_exit",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"subprocess\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "record_ci_result",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_edit_outcome",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "explain_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_context_receipt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_context_receipt_from_path",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "render_context_receipt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "explain_receipt_omission",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "recover_receipt_omission",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prepare_proof_guided_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "advance_proof_guided_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "inspect_proof_guided_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "checkpoint_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resume_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prefetch_related",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "entroly_dashboard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_for_vulnerabilities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "security_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_codebase_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ingest_diagram",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ingest_voice",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ingest_diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "epistemic_route",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_write_belief",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_query",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_write_action",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_time_travel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_hygiene_scan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prepare_task_dream",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compile_beliefs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "verify_beliefs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "blast_radius",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "process_change",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "execute_flow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_skill",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "manage_skills",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
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{
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