Entroly — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "entroly",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "entroly"
},
"server": {
"name": "entroly"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 86,
"threatScore": 93,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 1.2,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 6.3,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-AUTH-2",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (74 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (entroly/work_graph_path_policy.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`entroly/work_graph_path_policy.py:11`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "entroly/work_graph_path_policy.py"
},
"evidence": "filename is the leak. ``id_rsa`` and ``credentials.json`` disclose that a secret exists and what kind, and a vendored de",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "entroly/work_graph_path_policy.py",
"line": 11,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (entroly/cli.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`entroly/cli.py:271`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "entroly/cli.py"
},
"evidence": "uest resp = urllib.request.urlopen( \"https://pypi.org/pypi/entroly/json\", timeout=3",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "entroly/cli.py",
"line": 271,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"title": "Unsafe deserialization (entroly/server.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`entroly/server.py:2249`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "entroly/server.py"
},
"evidence": ", \"CWE-502\",\"Critical\",\"pickle.loads(\", None, \"Unsafe deserialization\"), (\"CRYPTO-001\",\"CWE-327\",\"High\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
"file": "entroly/server.py",
"line": 2249,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-AUTH-2",
"title": "Instruction-override directive",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Instruction-override directive detected in the description of tool \"security_scan\". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.",
"remediation": "Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "security_scan",
"field": "description"
},
"evidence": "ignore previous instructions",
"owasp": "LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection",
"data": {
"kind": "override"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/language_symbol_coverage.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/language_symbol_coverage.py:246`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "benchmarks/language_symbol_coverage.py"
},
"evidence": "dule_name] = module exec(compile(source, module.__file__, \"exec\"), module.__dict__) return module def _module_",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "benchmarks/language_symbol_coverage.py",
"line": 246,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (bench/fix_nb6.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`bench/fix_nb6.py:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bench/fix_nb6.py"
},
"evidence": "entroly'):\\n\", \" subprocess.run(['git', 'clone', '--depth', '1', 'https://github.com/juyterman1000/entroly.git',",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bench/fix_nb6.py",
"line": 31,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (bench/quality_eval.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`bench/quality_eval.py:162`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bench/quality_eval.py"
},
"evidence": "8\" try: r = subprocess.run( [ \"entroly\", \"optimize\", \"--task\", q",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bench/quality_eval.py",
"line": 162,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/agent_symbol_delivery.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/agent_symbol_delivery.py:60`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "benchmarks/agent_symbol_delivery.py"
},
"evidence": "str) -> str: return subprocess.run( [\"git\", *args], cwd=REPO_ROOT, capture_output=True, text=True, check=Tru",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "benchmarks/agent_symbol_delivery.py",
"line": 60,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/agentic_task_miner.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/agentic_task_miner.py:51`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "benchmarks/agentic_task_miner.py"
},
"evidence": "etedProcess: return subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"-C\", str(repo), *args], capture_output=True, te",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "benchmarks/agentic_task_miner.py",
"line": 51,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/agentic_tasks_run.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/agentic_tasks_run.py:447`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "benchmarks/agentic_tasks_run.py"
},
"evidence": "\") completed = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-m\", \"pytest\", task.test_file, \"-q\", \"--no-header\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "benchmarks/agentic_tasks_run.py",
"line": 447,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/audited_runner.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/audited_runner.py:90`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "benchmarks/audited_runner.py"
},
"evidence": "try: return subprocess.check_output( [\"git\", \"rev-parse\", \"HEAD\"], cwd=ROOT, text=True )",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "benchmarks/audited_runner.py",
"line": 90,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/closed_set_selection_frontier.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/closed_set_selection_frontier.py:52`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "benchmarks/closed_set_selection_frontier.py"
},
"evidence": "-> str: completed = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"rev-parse\", \"HEAD\"], cwd=ROOT, check=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "benchmarks/closed_set_selection_frontier.py",
"line": 52,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/coding_tasks.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/coding_tasks.py:99`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "benchmarks/coding_tasks.py"
},
"evidence": "try: subprocess.run( task.setup_command, shell=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "benchmarks/coding_tasks.py",
"line": 99,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/competitive_provenance.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/competitive_provenance.py:64`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "benchmarks/competitive_provenance.py"
},
"evidence": "() -> str: result = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"rev-parse\", \"HEAD\"], cwd=ROOT, capture_output=True, text=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "benchmarks/competitive_provenance.py",
"line": 64,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/compression_frontier.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/compression_frontier.py:526`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "benchmarks/compression_frontier.py"
},
"evidence": ", Any]: completed = subprocess.run( command, cwd=root, input=json.dumps(payload), ca",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "benchmarks/compression_frontier.py",
"line": 526,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"entroly\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "entroly"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "retrieve_compressed_span",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_compressed_spans",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_compression_receipts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remember_fragment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "optimize_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "entroly_retrieve",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "recall_relevant",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_outcome",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_test_result",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_command_exit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_ci_result",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_edit_outcome",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "explain_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_context_receipt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_context_receipt_from_path",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "render_context_receipt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "explain_receipt_omission",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "recover_receipt_omission",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prepare_proof_guided_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "advance_proof_guided_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "inspect_proof_guided_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "checkpoint_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resume_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prefetch_related",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "entroly_dashboard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_for_vulnerabilities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "security_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_codebase_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ingest_diagram",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ingest_voice",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ingest_diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "epistemic_route",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_write_belief",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_query",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_write_action",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_time_travel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_hygiene_scan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prepare_task_dream",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compile_beliefs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "verify_beliefs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "blast_radius",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "process_change",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "execute_flow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_skill",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "manage_skills",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coverage_gaps",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "refresh_beliefs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "sync_workspace_changes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "repo_file_map",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "start_workspace_listener",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compile_docs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_training_data",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "verify_provenance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "verify_and_repair",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
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