Entroly (juyterman1000) MCP Server
entroly
PyPI
v1.0.65
Published by juyterman1000 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 22.9 = 77. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −15.4 | Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value MTC-SRC-010 | injection |
| −6.3 | Unsafe deserialization MTC-SRC-007 | permissions |
| −1.2 | Instruction-override directive MTC-INJ-AUTH-2 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 77 − 7 = 70. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 18
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (entroly/ravs/executors.py)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`entroly/ravs/executors.py:221`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server entroly/ravs/executors.py
high Tool "record_command_exit" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "record_command_exit" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "subprocess"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool record_command_exit
high Dynamic code execution in server code (entroly/ravs/executors.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`entroly/ravs/executors.py:221`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server entroly/ravs/executors.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (bench/fix_nb6.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bench/fix_nb6.py:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bench/fix_nb6.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (bench/quality_eval.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bench/quality_eval.py:162`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bench/quality_eval.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (benchmarks/agentic_task_miner.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`benchmarks/agentic_task_miner.py:43`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server benchmarks/agentic_task_miner.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (benchmarks/audited_runner.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`benchmarks/audited_runner.py:90`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.check_output(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server benchmarks/audited_runner.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (benchmarks/coding_tasks.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`benchmarks/coding_tasks.py:86`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server benchmarks/coding_tasks.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (benchmarks/compression_frontier.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`benchmarks/compression_frontier.py:526`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server benchmarks/compression_frontier.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (benchmarks/compression_gauntlet.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`benchmarks/compression_gauntlet.py:441`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server benchmarks/compression_gauntlet.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (benchmarks/compression_latency.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`benchmarks/compression_latency.py:317`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server benchmarks/compression_latency.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (benchmarks/conformal_calibrate.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`benchmarks/conformal_calibrate.py:82`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.check_output(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server benchmarks/conformal_calibrate.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (benchmarks/eicv_baseline.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`benchmarks/eicv_baseline.py:111`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.check_output(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server benchmarks/eicv_baseline.py
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (entroly/cli.py)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`entroly/cli.py:239`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: urllib.request.urlopen(
"https://pypi.org/pypi/entroly/json"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server entroly/cli.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (entroly-wasm/js/cli.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`entroly-wasm/js/cli.js:264`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require(gwPath)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server entroly-wasm/js/cli.js
medium Unsafe deserialization (entroly/server.py)MTC-SRC-007
In the server's implementation (`entroly/server.py:3980`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pickle.loads(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server entroly/server.py
low Mutating tool "record_command_exit" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "record_command_exit" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool record_command_exit
low Instruction-override directiveMTC-INJ-AUTH-2
Instruction-override directive detected in the description of tool "security_scan". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.
Evidence: ignore previous instructions
Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.
Location: tool security_scan · description
Tools 62
Show each tool and what it can reach · statically extracted from the published source
record_command_exitruns code / shelladvance_proof_guided_contextno sensitive capabilityanalyze_codebase_healthno sensitive capabilityblast_radiusno sensitive capabilitycheckpoint_stateno sensitive capabilitycompile_beliefsno sensitive capabilitycompile_docsno sensitive capabilitycoverage_gapsno sensitive capabilitycreate_context_receiptno sensitive capabilitycreate_context_receipt_from_pathno sensitive capabilitycreate_skillno sensitive capabilityeicv_suppress_hallucinationsno sensitive capabilityeicv_verify_claimno sensitive capabilityentroly_dashboardno sensitive capabilityentroly_retrieveno sensitive capabilityepistemic_routeno sensitive capabilityexecute_flowno sensitive capabilityexplain_contextno sensitive capabilityexplain_receipt_omissionno sensitive capabilityexport_training_datano sensitive capabilityget_statsno sensitive capabilityingest_diagramno sensitive capabilityingest_diffno sensitive capabilityingest_voiceno sensitive capabilityinspect_proof_guided_contextno sensitive capabilitylist_compression_receiptsno sensitive capabilitymanage_skillsno sensitive capabilityoptimize_contextno sensitive capabilityprefetch_relatedno sensitive capabilityprepare_proof_guided_contextno sensitive capabilityprepare_task_dreamno sensitive capabilityprocess_changeno sensitive capabilityrecall_relevantno sensitive capabilityrecord_ci_resultno sensitive capabilityrecord_edit_outcomeno sensitive capabilityrecord_outcomeno sensitive capabilityrecord_test_resultno sensitive capabilityrecover_receipt_omissionno sensitive capabilityrefresh_beliefsno sensitive capabilityremember_fragmentno sensitive capabilityrender_context_receiptno sensitive capabilityrepo_file_mapno sensitive capabilityresume_stateno sensitive capabilityretrieve_compressed_spanno sensitive capabilityscan_for_vulnerabilitiesno sensitive capabilitysearch_compressed_spansno sensitive capabilitysecurity_reportno sensitive capabilitysecurity_scanno sensitive capabilitysmart_readno sensitive capabilitystart_workspace_listenerno sensitive capabilitysync_workspace_changesno sensitive capabilityvault_hygiene_scanno sensitive capabilityvault_queryno sensitive capabilityvault_searchno sensitive capabilityvault_statusno sensitive capabilityvault_time_travelno sensitive capabilityvault_write_actionno sensitive capabilityvault_write_beliefno sensitive capabilityverify_and_repairno sensitive capabilityverify_beliefsno sensitive capabilityverify_provenanceno sensitive capabilityverify_responseno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (62 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.65 latest |
C 70/100 | 18 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan entroly --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Entroly 1
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