Elmapicms MCP Server
@elmapicms/mcp-server
npm
v1.2.1
Published by @elmapicms — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for ElmapiCMS - manage collections, fields, content, and assets via AI agents
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: get_entry_version ⇒ create_webhook → delete_webhook. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow get_entry_version → create_webhook → delete_webhook
high Read-and-egress in one tool: "create_webhook"MTC-FLOW-003
Tool "create_webhook" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow create_webhook
high Read-and-egress in one tool: "update_webhook"MTC-FLOW-003
Tool "update_webhook" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow update_webhook
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "create_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "create_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool create_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "update_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "update_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool update_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url
Tools 40
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_webhooknetwork egressreads sensitive dataupdate_webhooknetwork egressreads sensitive datadelete_webhooknetwork egressget_entry_versioningests untrusted inputadd_project_localeno sensitive capabilitybulk_create_entriesno sensitive capabilitybulk_delete_entriesno sensitive capabilitybulk_update_asset_metadatano sensitive capabilitybulk_update_entriesno sensitive capabilitybulk_upload_assetsno sensitive capability
Show 30 more tools ↓
create_collectionno sensitive capabilitycreate_entryno sensitive capabilitycreate_fieldno sensitive capabilitydelete_assetno sensitive capabilitydelete_entryno sensitive capabilitydiscard_entry_draftno sensitive capabilityget_assetno sensitive capabilityget_collectionno sensitive capabilityget_entryno sensitive capabilityget_projectno sensitive capabilityget_webhookno sensitive capabilitylink_entry_translationno sensitive capabilitylist_assetsno sensitive capabilitylist_collectionsno sensitive capabilitylist_entriesno sensitive capabilitylist_entry_versionsno sensitive capabilitylist_webhook_logsno sensitive capabilitylist_webhooksno sensitive capabilitypatch_entryno sensitive capabilitypublish_entryno sensitive capabilityreorder_collectionsno sensitive capabilityreorder_fieldsno sensitive capabilityrevert_entry_versionno sensitive capabilityset_default_project_localeno sensitive capabilityunpublish_entryno sensitive capabilityupdate_collectionno sensitive capabilityupdate_entryno sensitive capabilityupdate_entry_version_labelno sensitive capabilityupdate_fieldno sensitive capabilityupload_assetno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 3
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (40 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.2.0 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-07 |
v1.1.0 |
A 99/100 | 0 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-01 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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