Elisym — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@elisym/mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@elisym/mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@elisym/mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (36 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:1554`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "rets\\.json|\\.env(\\..+)?|id_rsa|id_dsa|id_ecdsa|id_ed25519|authorized_keys|wallet\\.dat|credentials|.*-keypair\\.json|.*\\.p",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 1554,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { realpath, readFile, stat, mkdir, rm, writeFile, rename, unlink } from '",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 8,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([fetch_job_file]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_message]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "fetch_job_file → send_message"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [fetch_job_file] → sinks [send_message]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"fetch_job_file"
],
"sinks": [
"send_message"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"fetch_job_file"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"send_message"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "create_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "switch_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_agents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stop_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_job",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "submit_delegated_job",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_job_result",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fetch_job_file",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_my_jobs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_job_sessions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "submit_and_pay_job",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "submit_and_pay_job_from_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "submit_diff_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "buy_capability",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_dashboard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_agents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "verify_agent_identities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_capabilities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_identity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "submit_feedback",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_contacts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_message",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_conversations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_messages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_agent_policies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_balance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_delegation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "approve_delegation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "revoke_delegation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "estimate_payment_cost",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_payment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "withdraw",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Agent Identity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Solana Wallet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "8e163d8dac3b0d72e5b78d464ced280f2394ae1402d8038fb60e29fcb1193811",
"stats": {
"tools": 36,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}