Elisym MCP Server
@elisym/mcp
npm
v0.21.1
Source verified
Published by elisymlabs — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for elisym - AI agent discovery, jobs, and payments
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:1554`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rets\.json|\.env(\..+)?|id_rsa|id_dsa|id_ecdsa|id_ed25519|authorized_keys|wallet\.dat|credentials|.*-keypair\.json|.*\.p
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { realpath, readFile, stat, mkdir, rm, writeFile, rename, unlink } from '
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([fetch_job_file]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_message]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [fetch_job_file] → sinks [send_message]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow fetch_job_file → send_message
Tools 36
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
fetch_job_fileingests untrusted inputsend_messagenetwork egressadd_contactno sensitive capabilityAgent Identityno sensitive capabilityapprove_delegationno sensitive capabilitybuy_capabilityno sensitive capabilitycreate_agentno sensitive capabilitycreate_jobno sensitive capabilityestimate_payment_costno sensitive capabilityget_agent_policiesno sensitive capability
Show 26 more tools ↓
get_balanceno sensitive capabilityget_dashboardno sensitive capabilityget_delegationno sensitive capabilityget_identityno sensitive capabilityget_job_resultno sensitive capabilityget_messagesno sensitive capabilitylist_agentsno sensitive capabilitylist_capabilitiesno sensitive capabilitylist_contactsno sensitive capabilitylist_conversationsno sensitive capabilitylist_job_sessionsno sensitive capabilitylist_my_jobsno sensitive capabilityremove_contactno sensitive capabilityrevoke_delegationno sensitive capabilitysearch_agentsno sensitive capabilitysend_paymentno sensitive capabilitySolana Walletno sensitive capabilitystop_agentno sensitive capabilitysubmit_and_pay_jobno sensitive capabilitysubmit_and_pay_job_from_fileno sensitive capabilitysubmit_delegated_jobno sensitive capabilitysubmit_diff_reviewno sensitive capabilitysubmit_feedbackno sensitive capabilityswitch_agentno sensitive capabilityverify_agent_identitiesno sensitive capabilitywithdrawno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (36 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.21.1 latest |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.20.2 |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
v0.19.0 |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @elisym/mcp --onlineOther implementations of Elisym 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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