Electric Cherry — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "electric-cherry",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "electric-cherry"
},
"server": {
"name": "electric-cherry"
}
},
"grade": "C",
"score": {
"score": 71,
"threatScore": 78,
"grade": "C",
"band": "C",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 21.7,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-011",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (31 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (build/src/tools/renderer.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/src/tools/renderer.js:38`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/src/tools/renderer.js"
},
"evidence": "eval return eval(expr); }, args.expression); const formatted = result === undefined",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "build/src/tools/renderer.js",
"line": 38,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-011",
"title": "Assembled command execution and dynamic evaluation in the same server",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "The implementation both builds shell commands out of runtime values (`build/src/tools/electron.js`) and evaluates runtime values as code (`build/src/tools/renderer.js`). Each is a separate arbitrary-execution primitive; a server exposing both gives anything that reaches either one a direct path to running attacker-chosen code. These two sinks are in different files — confirm whether they are actually connected, or are unrelated code paths (e.g. a vendored bundle plus a CLI wrapper).",
"remediation": "Remove the dynamic eval, and pass command arguments as an argv array instead of building a shell string. If both are genuinely required, constrain and validate every value that can reach them.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "implementation"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rules": [
"MTC-SRC-009",
"MTC-SRC-010"
],
"commandFile": "build/src/tools/electron.js",
"evalFile": "build/src/tools/renderer.js",
"sameFile": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (build/src/tools/renderer.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/src/tools/renderer.js:38`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/src/tools/renderer.js"
},
"evidence": "eval return eval(expr); }, args.expression); const formatted = result === undefined",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "build/src/tools/renderer.js",
"line": 38,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/src/browser.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/src/browser.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/src/browser.js"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { tmpdir } from 'os'; import { mkdtempSync } from 'fs'; import { join } f",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/src/browser.js",
"line": 9,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/src/tools/electron.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/src/tools/electron.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/src/tools/electron.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'fs'; import { createServer } from 'net'; import { DE",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/src/tools/electron.js",
"line": 6,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (build/src/tools/electron.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/src/tools/electron.js:51`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/src/tools/electron.js"
},
"evidence": "{ executable = execSync(`defaults read \"${infoPath}\" CFBundleExecutable`, { encoding: 'utf8',",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "build/src/tools/electron.js",
"line": 51,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "electron_setup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "electron_connect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chrome",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chrome_list_connections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chrome_switch_connection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chrome_disconnect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "target",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "query_elements",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "click_element",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fill_element",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "navigate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_console_logs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "take_screenshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "renderer_evaluate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "v8_connect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "v8_evaluate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "v8_disconnect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "v8_list_connections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "enable_network",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_network_requests",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clear_network_requests",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "enable_debug_tools",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "breakpoint",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "step",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "execution",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "call_stack",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "evaluate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pause_on_exceptions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "help",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hide_tools",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "show_tools",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "ff47795ba32b494e249a6c3c0211cdc323b4ae0decb7ac2543284a93bd8a5e5c",
"stats": {
"tools": 31,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 5,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}