Electric Cherry MCP Server
electric-cherry
npm
v0.1.1
Published by brandon-fryslie — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Electron debugging MCP server for renderer (CDP) and main process (V8 Inspector)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 21.7 = 78. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −15.4 | Assembled command execution and dynamic evaluation in the same server MTC-SRC-011 | injection |
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 78 − 7 = 71. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (build/src/tools/renderer.js)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`build/src/tools/renderer.js:38`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval return eval(expr); }, args.expression); const formatted = result === undefined
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/tools/renderer.js
high Assembled command execution and dynamic evaluation in the same serverMTC-SRC-011
The implementation both builds shell commands out of runtime values (`build/src/tools/electron.js`) and evaluates runtime values as code (`build/src/tools/renderer.js`). Each is a separate arbitrary-execution primitive; a server exposing both gives anything that reaches either one a direct path to running attacker-chosen code. These two sinks are in different files — confirm whether they are actually connected, or are unrelated code paths (e.g. a vendored bundle plus a CLI wrapper).
Fix: Remove the dynamic eval, and pass command arguments as an argv array instead of building a shell string. If both are genuinely required, constrain and validate every value that can reach them.
Location: server implementation
high Dynamic code execution in server code (build/src/tools/renderer.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`build/src/tools/renderer.js:38`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval return eval(expr); }, args.expression); const formatted = result === undefined
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/tools/renderer.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/src/browser.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/src/browser.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { tmpdir } from 'os'; import { mkdtempSync } from 'fs'; import { join } f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/browser.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/src/tools/electron.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/src/tools/electron.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'fs'; import { createServer } from 'net'; import { DE
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/tools/electron.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (build/src/tools/electron.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`build/src/tools/electron.js:51`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { executable = execSync(`defaults read "${infoPath}" CFBundleExecutable`, { encoding: 'utf8',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/tools/electron.js
Tools 31
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
breakpointno sensitive capabilitycall_stackno sensitive capabilitychromeno sensitive capabilitychrome_disconnectno sensitive capabilitychrome_list_connectionsno sensitive capabilitychrome_switch_connectionno sensitive capabilityclear_network_requestsno sensitive capabilityclick_elementno sensitive capabilityelectron_connectno sensitive capabilityelectron_setupno sensitive capability
Show 21 more tools ↓
enable_debug_toolsno sensitive capabilityenable_networkno sensitive capabilityevaluateno sensitive capabilityexecutionno sensitive capabilityfill_elementno sensitive capabilityget_console_logsno sensitive capabilityget_network_requestsno sensitive capabilityhelpno sensitive capabilityhide_toolsno sensitive capabilitynavigateno sensitive capabilitypause_on_exceptionsno sensitive capabilityquery_elementsno sensitive capabilityrenderer_evaluateno sensitive capabilityshow_toolsno sensitive capabilitystepno sensitive capabilitytake_screenshotno sensitive capabilitytargetno sensitive capabilityv8_connectno sensitive capabilityv8_disconnectno sensitive capabilityv8_evaluateno sensitive capabilityv8_list_connectionsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (31 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.1 latest |
C 71/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan electric-cherry --onlineMore in Browser Automation
Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that integrates AgentQL data extraction capabilities.
Screenshot any URL or HTML as PNG/JPEG/WebP from your AI agent. Full-page, clean, no install.
MCP server for aria51 accessibility scanner
Bridge any browser web app to Claude Code via MCP
Browserbase’s official MCP server: cloud headless browsers for agents, with sessions and screenshots.
MCP server for AI web browser automation using Browserbase and Stagehand