El Gringo — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "el-gringo",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "el-gringo"
},
"server": {
"name": "el-gringo"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (65 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (elgringo/tools/base.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`elgringo/tools/base.py:102`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "elgringo/tools/base.py"
},
"evidence": "\"~/.ssh\", \"~/.gnupg\", \"~/.aws/credentials\", \"/System\", \"/Library\", \"/bin\", \"/sbin\", \"/usr/bin\", ] # Def",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "elgringo/tools/base.py",
"line": 102,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (elgringo/intelligence/auto_failure_detector.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`elgringo/intelligence/auto_failure_detector.py:87`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "elgringo/intelligence/auto_failure_detector.py"
},
"evidence": "(r'eval\\s*\\(', \"Use of eval() is a security risk\", \"critical\"), (r'exec\\s*\\(', \"Use of exec() is a security ris",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "elgringo/intelligence/auto_failure_detector.py",
"line": 87,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (elgringo/validation/code_validator.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`elgringo/validation/code_validator.py:286`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "elgringo/validation/code_validator.py"
},
"evidence": "', \"Use of eval() is a security risk\", \"Avoid eval() - use safer alternatives like ast.literal",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "elgringo/validation/code_validator.py",
"line": 286,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (elgringo/agents/specialists.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`elgringo/agents/specialists.py:210`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "elgringo/agents/specialists.py"
},
"evidence": "mand_injection\": \"Avoid shell=True, use subprocess with list arguments, validate and sanitize inputs\", \"xss_",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "elgringo/agents/specialists.py",
"line": 210,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (elgringo/apple/apple_shortcuts.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`elgringo/apple/apple_shortcuts.py:210`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "elgringo/apple/apple_shortcuts.py"
},
"evidence": "y: result = subprocess.run( [\"shortcuts\", \"list\"], capture_output=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "elgringo/apple/apple_shortcuts.py",
"line": 210,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (elgringo/apple/coreml_agent.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`elgringo/apple/coreml_agent.py:113`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "elgringo/apple/coreml_agent.py"
},
"evidence": "y: result = subprocess.run( [\"sysctl\", \"-n\", \"machdep.cpu.brand_string\"], ca",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "elgringo/apple/coreml_agent.py",
"line": 113,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (elgringo/apple/mlx_inference.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`elgringo/apple/mlx_inference.py:147`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "elgringo/apple/mlx_inference.py"
},
"evidence": "ss result = subprocess.run( [\"vm_stat\"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=2,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "elgringo/apple/mlx_inference.py",
"line": 147,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (elgringo/apple/model_setup.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`elgringo/apple/model_setup.py:44`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "elgringo/apple/model_setup.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"ollama\", \"list\"], capture_output=True, text=True, time",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "elgringo/apple/model_setup.py",
"line": 44,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (elgringo/apple/smart_router.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`elgringo/apple/smart_router.py:87`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "elgringo/apple/smart_router.py"
},
"evidence": "p info result = subprocess.run( [\"sysctl\", \"-n\", \"machdep.cpu.brand_string\"], capture_ou",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "elgringo/apple/smart_router.py",
"line": 87,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (elgringo/autonomous/file_watcher.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`elgringo/autonomous/file_watcher.py:733`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "elgringo/autonomous/file_watcher.py"
},
"evidence": "ts result = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"log\", \"--name-only\", \"--pretty=format:\", \"-n\", \"20\"],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "elgringo/autonomous/file_watcher.py",
"line": 733,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (elgringo/cli/cli.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`elgringo/cli/cli.py:229`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "elgringo/cli/cli.py"
},
"evidence": "ss result = subprocess.run( [\"ollama\", \"list\"], capture_output=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "elgringo/cli/cli.py",
"line": 229,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (elgringo/cli/context.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`elgringo/cli/context.py:105`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "elgringo/cli/context.py"
},
"evidence": "try: git_root = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"rev-parse\", \"--show-toplevel\"], capture_output=",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "elgringo/cli/context.py",
"line": 105,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (elgringo/cli/setup.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`elgringo/cli/setup.py:208`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "elgringo/cli/setup.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"ollama\", \"list\"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "elgringo/cli/setup.py",
"line": 208,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (elgringo/business_suite/integrations.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`elgringo/business_suite/integrations.py:425`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "elgringo/business_suite/integrations.py"
},
"evidence": "rt requests response = requests.post( \"https://api.aiteamstudio.com/v1/chat\", headers={{ \"Authorization",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "elgringo/business_suite/integrations.py",
"line": 425,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"el-gringo\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "el-gringo"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "elgringo_collaborate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "elgringo_code_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "elgringo_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "elgringo_plan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "elgringo_project_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "elgringo_ask",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_build",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_execute",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_generate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_debug",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_architect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_brainstorm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_security_audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "elgringo_stream",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "elgringo_feedback",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "elgringo_diagnose",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "elgringo_changelog",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "elgringo_refactor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "elgringo_test_generate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "elgringo_deploy_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "elgringo_onboard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "elgringo_debate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "claude_second_opinion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_store_solution",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_store_mistake",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "verify_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fredfix_scan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_costs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_roi",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_leaderboard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_rate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "claude_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "claude_reflect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mlx_ask",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mlx_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_generate_app",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_semantic_diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_code_analysis",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_teach",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_apple_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_mlx_generate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_parallel_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_performance_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_structured",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_approval_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_approval_decide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_approval_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_workflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_schemas",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_guardian",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_knowledge_store",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "elgringo_project_register",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_cache_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_quality_watchdog",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_arbitrage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_provider_compare",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_scan_response",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_transparency",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_agent_insights",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_nexus_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_team_nexus_patterns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "f1132e63e5a630e9d62c1e9b8981bf458a7dfd1d8f96067bf75db4c60c1ecc87",
"stats": {
"tools": 65,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 13,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 1
}
}
}