El Gringo MCP Server
el-gringo
PyPI
v1.1.0
Published by thegringo-ai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 14
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (elgringo/tools/base.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`elgringo/tools/base.py:102`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "~/.ssh", "~/.gnupg", "~/.aws/credentials", "/System", "/Library", "/bin", "/sbin", "/usr/bin", ] # Def
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server elgringo/tools/base.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (elgringo/intelligence/auto_failure_detector.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`elgringo/intelligence/auto_failure_detector.py:87`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: (r'eval\s*\(', "Use of eval() is a security risk", "critical"), (r'exec\s*\(', "Use of exec() is a security ris
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server elgringo/intelligence/auto_failure_detector.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (elgringo/validation/code_validator.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`elgringo/validation/code_validator.py:286`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ', "Use of eval() is a security risk", "Avoid eval() - use safer alternatives like ast.literal
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server elgringo/validation/code_validator.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (elgringo/agents/specialists.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`elgringo/agents/specialists.py:210`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: mand_injection": "Avoid shell=True, use subprocess with list arguments, validate and sanitize inputs", "xss_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server elgringo/agents/specialists.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (elgringo/apple/apple_shortcuts.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`elgringo/apple/apple_shortcuts.py:210`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( ["shortcuts", "list"], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server elgringo/apple/apple_shortcuts.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (elgringo/apple/coreml_agent.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`elgringo/apple/coreml_agent.py:113`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( ["sysctl", "-n", "machdep.cpu.brand_string"], ca
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server elgringo/apple/coreml_agent.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (elgringo/apple/mlx_inference.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`elgringo/apple/mlx_inference.py:147`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ss result = subprocess.run( ["vm_stat"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=2,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server elgringo/apple/mlx_inference.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (elgringo/apple/model_setup.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`elgringo/apple/model_setup.py:44`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["ollama", "list"], capture_output=True, text=True, time
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server elgringo/apple/model_setup.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (elgringo/apple/smart_router.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`elgringo/apple/smart_router.py:87`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: p info result = subprocess.run( ["sysctl", "-n", "machdep.cpu.brand_string"], capture_ou
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server elgringo/apple/smart_router.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (elgringo/autonomous/file_watcher.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`elgringo/autonomous/file_watcher.py:733`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ts result = subprocess.run( ["git", "log", "--name-only", "--pretty=format:", "-n", "20"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server elgringo/autonomous/file_watcher.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (elgringo/cli/cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`elgringo/cli/cli.py:229`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ss result = subprocess.run( ["ollama", "list"], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server elgringo/cli/cli.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (elgringo/cli/context.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`elgringo/cli/context.py:105`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: git_root = subprocess.run( ["git", "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel"], capture_output=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server elgringo/cli/context.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (elgringo/cli/setup.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`elgringo/cli/setup.py:208`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["ollama", "list"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server elgringo/cli/setup.py
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (elgringo/business_suite/integrations.py)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`elgringo/business_suite/integrations.py:425`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt requests response = requests.post( "https://api.aiteamstudio.com/v1/chat", headers={{ "Authorization
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server elgringo/business_suite/integrations.py
Tools 65
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ai_team_agent_insightsno sensitive capabilityai_team_apple_infono sensitive capabilityai_team_approval_createno sensitive capabilityai_team_approval_decideno sensitive capabilityai_team_approval_listno sensitive capabilityai_team_arbitrageno sensitive capabilityai_team_architectno sensitive capabilityai_team_brainstormno sensitive capabilityai_team_buildno sensitive capabilityai_team_cache_statsno sensitive capability
Show 55 more tools ↓
ai_team_code_analysisno sensitive capabilityai_team_costsno sensitive capabilityai_team_debugno sensitive capabilityai_team_executeno sensitive capabilityai_team_generateno sensitive capabilityai_team_generate_appno sensitive capabilityai_team_guardianno sensitive capabilityai_team_healthno sensitive capabilityai_team_knowledge_storeno sensitive capabilityai_team_leaderboardno sensitive capabilityai_team_mlx_generateno sensitive capabilityai_team_nexus_patternsno sensitive capabilityai_team_nexus_searchno sensitive capabilityai_team_parallel_reviewno sensitive capabilityai_team_performance_reportno sensitive capabilityai_team_provider_compareno sensitive capabilityai_team_quality_watchdogno sensitive capabilityai_team_rateno sensitive capabilityai_team_reviewno sensitive capabilityai_team_roino sensitive capabilityai_team_scan_responseno sensitive capabilityai_team_schemasno sensitive capabilityai_team_security_auditno sensitive capabilityai_team_semantic_diffno sensitive capabilityai_team_structuredno sensitive capabilityai_team_teachno sensitive capabilityai_team_transparencyno sensitive capabilityai_team_workflowno sensitive capabilityclaude_contextno sensitive capabilityclaude_reflectno sensitive capabilityclaude_second_opinionno sensitive capabilityelgringo_askno sensitive capabilityelgringo_changelogno sensitive capabilityelgringo_code_taskno sensitive capabilityelgringo_collaborateno sensitive capabilityelgringo_debateno sensitive capabilityelgringo_deploy_checkno sensitive capabilityelgringo_diagnoseno sensitive capabilityelgringo_feedbackno sensitive capabilityelgringo_onboardno sensitive capabilityelgringo_planno sensitive capabilityelgringo_project_infono sensitive capabilityelgringo_project_registerno sensitive capabilityelgringo_refactorno sensitive capabilityelgringo_reviewno sensitive capabilityelgringo_streamno sensitive capabilityelgringo_test_generateno sensitive capabilityfredfix_scanno sensitive capabilitymemory_searchno sensitive capabilitymemory_statsno sensitive capabilitymemory_store_mistakeno sensitive capabilitymemory_store_solutionno sensitive capabilitymlx_askno sensitive capabilitymlx_statusno sensitive capabilityverify_codeno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (65 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 14 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan el-gringo --online --registry pypiMore in Developer Tools
Security scan results for the 1stay MCP server.
Security scan results for the Adguard Home MCP server.
Security scan results for the Ado Browser MCP server.
Security scan results for the Adobe Experience Dev MCP server.
Security scan results for the Aemet MCP server.
Security scan results for the Affinity Mcp Bridge MCP server.